Kellogg's Global Politics

Good News for Democracy: Interview with Joseph Asunka

August 16, 2022 Anita Kellogg
Kellogg's Global Politics
Good News for Democracy: Interview with Joseph Asunka
Show Notes Transcript Chapter Markers

In this episode, Anita interviews Joseph Asunka, the CEO of Afrobarometer, about democracy in Africa. Afrobarometer is “a pan-African, non-partisan survey research network that has been conducting public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy, and society since 1999.” Before joining Afrobarometer, Asunka was previously a program officer in the Global Development and Population program at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and a lecturer in political science at UCLA.

We also discuss the aftermath of Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan and whether it has led to a new normal in the Taiwan Strait. We look at the specter of populism in Italy, as well as Kenya’s third democratic election and what it portends for the future of East Africa. We wrap up the show by looking at the non-aligned movement and why these countries refuse to take sides in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Articles and Resources Mentioned in Episode

Ryan’s article in War on the Rocks

Rising US-China tensions over Taiwan

Election Roundup: Italy and Kenya

Democracy in Africa: Interview with Joseph Asunka

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Welcome to Kellogg's Global Politics, a podcast on current events in US foreign policy and international affairs. My name is Dr. Anita Kellogg, an international relations scholar specializing in the relationship between economics and national security. I'm here with my co-host, Ryan Kellogg, an expert in energy investment and policy. Thanks and glad to be here. This is episode 17 and we're recording this on August 13, 2022. I recently had the pleasure of interviewing Joseph Asunka, the CEO of Afrobarometer about democracy in Africa. Afrobarometer is a Pan-African non-partisan survey research network that's been conducting public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy, and society since 1999. It's something that political scientists and other economics and other social scientists use all the time. So it's a pretty big deal. Joe was a fellow colleague of mine at UCLA. So we actually begin with Pelosi's trip to Taiwan, which led to what the economist calls the fourth Taiwan crisis between the United States and Canada. We discussed the aftermath of the trip and whether it has led to a new normal in the Taiwan Strait. We then discussed the state of democracy in the world with updates on elections in Italy and Kenya. This is followed up with a discussion on the non-aligned movement in white who refuses to take sides in the Russia-Ukraine war. Finally, we wrap up with my conversation with Joe on how democracy is viewed by Africans and whether China's presence in Africa undermines support for democracy. So to begin with, been busy a couple of weeks. It's a busy month for us, but wanted to begin with an article of yours in the war on the rocks. So why don't you tell us more about it? Yeah. Yeah. So I had the pleasure to work with a colleague of mine, D.R. Burnett, who's a West Point graduate and served in the Army during the Gulf War and has worked in the oil industry kind of like myself for quite a number of years. When we were able to publish a piece, the piece is called Reviving the Petroleum Administration for War, a case for government industry partnership. And it really builds on a lot of the conversations that we've had on the podcast around the energy security issues that the Russian-Ukraine war have exposed. And I think the one that we really gleaned on was around kind of the United States oil industry, the idea that with the advent of the Shale Revolution, so the huge explosive growth in U.S. domestic production back in the early 2000s had supposedly changed the equation and had created within the U.S. being a swing producer, being able to constrain prices. That was the great hope, that kind of the iron grip that OPEC had on global oil price was forever shattered and that the U.S. through its shale producers would be able to keep a global cap on prices and protect U.S. and Western consumers from extreme volatility. That obviously failed, and we talked about all the reasons why we kind of highlight that within the article. So the main thrust of the article is looking back to World War II, back when the government and industry had a very close and unique partnership, we contrasted against kind of the experience with the British, which was very top-down, and focus on the fact that given the unique nature of capitalism kind of within the U.S. and the emphasis on the free market during World War II, it was really the government, depending on the industry, and partnering very closely with them, depending on these huge working committees within the industry, to deliver the needed oil production for the war effort. So it's really kind of looking ahead to the future. How could we prevent the crisis that we're currently in, that our European allies are currently in, through a closer partnership with the government? So if you're interested, definitely check it out. I think it's a good read. We've got a lot of good feedback about it. Yeah, I think it's excellent, and I'm not saying that as your wife, I just, when I read it, I just thought, wow, this is a really good piece. So yes, again, I echo, I hope everyone will take the time to check it out, and of course, it will be in the show notes. Yeah, so that was probably the main thing. So we mentioned in an earlier show that I was on, it's interviewed by Pyotr Kurzin, who's Russian-British on his clubhouse about China. And so he's kind of moved on to Twitter spaces. These are just open forums where people can ask questions. There's one host, and he kind of un-mutes people, and mutes people. And I found the one he had on just a geopolitical roundup the other day, kind of interesting because of where, getting a sense of what people thought about what was happening in Taiwan and China, well, and how much that was on people's thoughts. But there was a lot of, well, why is Pelosi, why is this so criticized, we couldn't back down, who cares about how China responds, we're eventually going to get in a conflict with them anyway. So a lot of that inspired some of my talking points in our first session. So Pelosi did decide to visit Taiwan and led to, as I said earlier in the show, another crisis in the Taiwan Strait. And then a lot of people were surprised at the time of the visit. China didn't really have much of a response. But as soon as she left, they did respond by conducting their largest ever military exercises near Taiwan. And after a 72-hour show, force, China said it would hold new drills near the island, a sign that Beijing might be seeking to normalize its military presence around Taiwan, allowing Chinese forces to practice imposing a slow squeeze on the island. One of the problems we have here is, for all the reasons the military sat down with Pelosi and told her not to go, is that you have a higher level of tensions and China being more assertive with its military because it feels like an essence that has to, because as I'll talk about a little bit, the US kind of reneging on its when China deals to so explicitly support Taiwan as an independent country. It's pretty significant what has happened, but it's also possible to overblow it. Yeah. So I kind of focus mostly on some of the military analysis. And when it found it interesting that they recreated and expanded upon incrementally kind of the exact same exercises they did following the 95-96 crisis around the islands. But this time, it made the effort of getting closer to the islands, kind of in their live exercise drills, and also penetrating the boundary of kind of where Taiwan sees it as its territorial waters. So it's definitely kind of provocation. And then that kind of raises, if there are regular exercises, then the US is certainly under pressure now to continue conducting passage, right of passage through the Taiwan Strait, as well as potentially having closer relations with Taiwan in terms of doing exercises and military drills together themselves. So yeah, it's definitely an escalation. There's a much higher chance if China does go through in like 95-96, and this becomes a regular annual exercise where they're not only firing kind of a plane in an assault, but also plane in a blockade. And I thought the analysis around that was interesting because it was like, it's pretty consistent how to stop a force from invading an island. You just have to sink as many of their ships as possible. But to stop a blockade of the island, which is famously dependent, I think it's like 98% of its food were energy from imports. How you break a long-term blockade, if that's the way that they kind of squeeze as opposed to a full-on military assault, which some of the tabletop exercises found that while the Chinese had initial success that ended up stalling out short of their objectives in a lot of cases. Yeah, just even as you talk about it, I wonder though, they also are telegraphing their moves so that the US knows that it should focus now on breaking a blockade, figuring out the best way to break a blockade like that. Yeah, I mean, I think that's the same from military intelligence. What they were, I mean, the positive side is you observe Chinese, because the biggest question is their capability to coordinate forces. So to coordinate their Navy, their Marines, their air forces, and a coordinated assault. Famously we've seen how bad the Russians are at that. They have no coordination ability whatsoever. So there's that, but then yeah, the idea of, okay, if they are looking to blockade, what are kind of the countermeasures to that and what can be worked out? Because I know that a lot of what the talk has been about the porcupine strategy, the idea of making Taiwan through asymmetrical warfare such a painful target that the idea of invading it is just not attractive to China. But maybe yeah, the blockade is the way for them to counter that. So then how do you counter the blockade? Right. And if anyone thinks there's any doubts, the military spends a lot of time thinking about the conflict with Taiwan, which would lead to conflict with China, a lot of time. And one thing that I found really interesting as I was sort of beginning the onboarding process for my job as an assistant professor at the National Defense University is that 50% of the curriculum they're under directive should be about China. So I sometimes read about how the US is not concerned with the war. They're under repaired for a potential war with China. And that does not seem to be true. But it's also in this context is really significant, I think, that how much the military asked Pelosi not to go. Yeah. Yeah. It makes their job much more difficult. I mean, the chance of bad things happening, carrying out, I mean, do you carry this out? If the Chinese carry out more continuous military drill, very frequent, you'd need to still show that the Taiwan Strait is free passage. So obviously during a live military exercise, or even through the presence of lots of Chinese vessels passing one of our aircraft battle groups through, I mean, it just raises the risk considerably. It does. People already knew tensions were high. China certainly would not have had the excuse to have the kind of high level military drills that it did for 72 hours. And then that kind of leading, as you said, to this new normal. I think the Senkaku Daiyu Islands crisis in 2012, there's something to learn from that. And sort of what was interesting is you had, it was different in many ways, but you had for like six months really highly increased military in the disputed waters that are agreed, similar to Taiwan, China, that neither country has kind of sovereignty over. And those are also an important shipping route, too, that is important to remain the freedom out of the seas. So the US was kind of, there was a higher level, too, of a chance for miscalculation between China and Japan and even the United States. So basically, though, after six months, the high levelness intensity, they drew back, but they have still have regular air and Navy patrols within 12 nautical miles of the islands. So once China does wrap up this stuff, ramp up their tensions and activities that even when they pull back, they don't pull back all the way. Now on the other hand, has this really changed the relationship between China and Japan and not in terms of economics and trade? So those are all kind of interesting aspects when we talk about the new normal. But I think it's also important to understand why China reacted to Pelosi's visit. And one is the sense that US is deteriorating in its commitment to the One China policy. And there are reasons for this that are not purely propaganda on the China's part. Basically the sort of violation of strategic ambiguity as well by not specifying whether or how it would intervene in a war over the islands. And one of the reasons to do this is to say outright that the US will clearly defend Taiwan militarily is that one, it could give Taiwan extremists, which has happened in the past, certainly advocate for a separate country and to vote on making it an independent country. But also the concern that that would lead to a declaration of war by China. So we are committed to not allowing China to take Taiwan over militarily already. That was in the Taiwanese relations act passed in the 70s, which I talked about last time. The problem is Biden has three times, three times has said that we will defend Taiwan militarily. Now, in actuality, you can have something that's true and known to be true. But the more you say it out loud, then the more the Chinese can feel like the US is less committed to its policy. Now the White House tries to walk those back, but three times is obviously not a gaffe. And then he also said last year that Taiwan was independent, even bigger gaffe to China. So it's not purely propaganda. And the timing is quite problematic because there are issues with the COVID strategy and an economic slowdown. And so Chi is running for an unprecedented running, running in terms of the Communist Party has a vote, not the people, but for unprecedented third term as head of China. And what I read, I didn't realize this detail, but this month, the party bigwigs will be meeting in a resort town where they have informal discussions about policies and personnel. So that's a pretty big meeting about what's going to happen within the party. Who's going to get promoted. And so a lot of people, the timing is he had to show strength to the people and he needs to booster his reputation. Yes, I'm going to push back against the idea that this is US provocations all out and avoid. I mean, the thing with Xi is that he's taken a very aggressive stance towards Taiwan and sees as the only way to submit his legacy so that he is equal to Mao, equal to Deng Xiaoping is the unification of Taiwan with the mainland. And that's why there's so much speculation on when is that timeline given his unprecedented third term and in his age, a lot of people speculate that could be in the 2030s. He himself has stated that this issue should be settled by the 100th anniversary of the communist takeover in 2049. So the need to send a strong message when these provocations are coming from Xi as a stated foreign policy firmly embraced by the elites within the Communist Party as a policy, you have to take that into account. That's not just all the US has decided that the one China policy, no, Xi decided that the one China policy and showed through Hong Kong that you can't trust the idea of two systems when China or whatever it's called. So one of the points there is that even Xi's rhetoric, which definitely he's been more of a nationalist, isn't any different than any proclamation before. Not just rhetoric, but military spending and the technology they are spending specifically with the focus of invading and conquering Taiwan. That has been the focus since he's taken over in terms of the military revitalization. You could say that it's been a focus of the Communist Party since the last crisis in the 1990s. So in that crisis, there was more military provocations towards Taiwan that were ramped up because the Taiwanese president visited the United States. And so again, it seemed a violation of the one China policy and having official relations instead of unofficial economic relations. Militarily, I think for sure they ever since that point that they have invested in their military specifically for that in general naval dominance. Yeah. I mean, I think there is to an extent, but I think Xi's definitely taken it to a whole new level and I think importantly made it a stated policy goal with a timeframe attached to it to that 2049 time. So one of the things that was interesting when I was in Hawaii was sort of this historical analysis of exactly this, how things really changed in the documents in terms of redefining Taiwan and sort of making also this argument about Xi's legacy and stuff. But the timeline actually has always been in those documents. The only thing that might be different is the rhetoric about them and Xi bringing them up more. But the timeframes are not unique to him. Well, that's maybe the emphasis then. So I think it's more rhetoric. I'm not saying that there are no provocations on the Chinese part, but the US has also been full of provocations itself. And one thing that had kind of started China's concerns about US commitment to the one China policy was after 2016 when the Trump administration expanded high level official visits and arms cells to the island, including offensive weapons. And so that was a change. But also, and I believe he held a phone call with the Taiwanese president, which is unprecedented too, because it's just important to state that the US has been really careful to pursue economic ties. And of course, the Biden Administration’s military and defense, which is also clearly articulated in the Taiwan Relations Act. But the US under Trump and then continuation under Biden has had its own provocations there. So yes, it's not one sided on either side. Yeah. I think that's great. I think the one interesting thing will be how much Taiwan features in the planning session for the Chinese government in November, how much does that become part of a kind of stated policy? How much does it emphasize? How much does rhetoric change compared to previous years? I think everybody's looking to read kind of the tea leaves on is there a new more aggressive stance? Because before, they always held hope that there could be peaceful political reunification through the support of the Kuomintang party within Taiwan, which is very pro-Basic. And through economic ties. But that now is completely shattered. I mean, polling shows and then the example that China made of Hong Kong shows that the proposal will not work, that there's no popular will within Taiwan. So the alternative, the only alternative, if this is truly a set timeline that's been, I guess, in the books for a while, then how is China going to work towards achieving that goal? Right. And so a couple of things here is, Taiwan, people have been pretty apathetic. They don't want Chinese control, but they haven't had any real feeling about fighting against China. And there's not even necessarily support for fighting against China if China invaded in previous opinion polls. Yeah, I don't know about that. But I will agree that, yeah, they support the status quo above everything else. And they definitely don't want to see provocations of the sort. But so it'd be interesting if this changes any public sentiment in Taiwan. Everybody says it does, but they're just saying that without showing any evidence of it. And Taiwan needs to, as we've mentioned before, dramatically increase its emphasis on the military, expand possibly conscription. There's a fight over what kind of weapons it's asking from the United States and they're complaining the U.S. is redirecting so much of it to Ukraine. And the U.S. keeps saying you're asking us for things that would not help you in any sort of conflict with China. So yeah, and that's where, I mean, they can work out these sort of issues with that closer cooperations and kind of joint exercises. But yeah, there's definitely a disconnect right now where the Taiwanese want big weapons systems. But everything that I've read is you take Ukraine and Russia and double or triple the gap in terms of power and army size and equipment and apply that to Taiwan and China. They can't fight and a straight up fight. So it has to be asymmetrical. They're not going to get air superiority. They're not going to have these things, but they can make themselves that prickly porcupine, which is different. And that's one of the critiques, though, of the U.S. sometimes like Biden saying things he has is that Taiwan seems to be left with the feeling like they don't have to defend themselves. Other more powerful countries will come to their defense and they won't have to worry about it. They don't seem to be the population who does not have a lot of support for the military. It seems to not think that they need to be prepared themselves as a country. Yeah. Now, I mean, everything I've read is that the people, these aren't the battle-hardened Ukrainians that fought for seven years against Russia. These are pretty soft. Well, it's just that they're not concerned, or if they are concerned, they think someone else will take care of the problem. I don't know that the Ukrainians ever thought that. Right. So there's actually a good article about why these situations should not be conflated too much Russia, Ukraine, and China, Taiwan. But if the Taiwanese do not change their security policy, then China is doing this with few repercussions. Yeah. But I think, I mean, I think Ukraine has been a wake-up call to Taiwan as well. And I think you will see major changes. We haven't seen evidence of that so far. So I want to see evidence. I want to see them actually do something. I think there's been time to do something that they haven't really done. Now, the last notable thing I think that came out of it, though, that is negative for China, is that the G7 wrote a letter to the Taiwanese president that there would be a coalitional response if China invaded the island. So before it's only been really talk of the United States and maybe Japan, but this was the first time all the G7 countries such as France and Europe have committed to being part of a coalition. So that's pretty big. Yeah. And I think, again, it's the lessons learned from the Ukraine situation and the dangers of appeasement or ignoring provocative actions. Yeah. I mean, no one thinks that Europe has a lot to contribute in this type of warfare. No, that's not true. I mean, one, the British probably have what's still the third biggest navy, the French have an aircraft. I mean, in their presence in Asia, and France has a major power, Europe definitely has punch within the region. More interesting is Japan. So the fact that missiles flew into Japan's claimed territory draws them in to potentially establishing more relationship with Taiwan around security issues. Again, though, I want to see evidence that they were kind of non-reactive. Yeah. I think it's more, it creates an opening and there was a good exchange between the Japanese Prime Minister and the Taiwanese president around the issue. So it's more an opening, will that grow into something kind of the US-Japan, Taiwan alliance? Because like... Yeah, it remains to be seen. Yeah. Because, I mean, the crisis, the intensity of the crisis is over the 72 hours. And even with this new normal situation, I mean, it didn't, like I said, China-Japan relationship as that, I mean, they've been aggravated by other things. But China and Japan signed a new trade agreement at the end of the height of the 2012 crisis. So it's very possible to me that the Taiwanese could get at least a population, not the government, but the population could become complacent again, now that the drama of this is over. All right. So I think we covered that. Yep. I think so. And on to our election roundup of where democracy status in the world and with Italy and Kenya. So you did all the research for Italy, so share your perspective. Yeah. So Italy has definitely been capturing some headlines, you know, first with the fact that they're having a scheduled where a snap election following the fall of Mario Draghi's government in July. So this election is going to take place on September 25th. And like I mentioned, it came as a surprise to the EU and I think to Italians themselves. So Draghi was a former Goldman Managing Director and more famously kind of European central bank chief and was critical in saving the euro during its last crisis. But he became Prime Minister in February of 2021 and led a very, I mean, gave great comfort to the financial markets. He was actually able to put together a critical reform plan with the EU. The EU kind of in response to COVID situation and looking for economic recovery had a joint financial raise among all 27 member countries. And Italy actually received the largest recipient of that about 200 million euros under the condition that, you know, provide certain financial reforms to the sector. So it was seen as a great accomplishment for Draghi and his administration. However, the coalition itself was very weak because Italy has a lot of small parties with varying interest. So they were a center right, sorry, a center left party that also consisted of the five star movement, which rose as a populist movement in 2018. I think actually they briefly held the Prime Minister ship kind of the lead pole position within Italy. It's very unstable. Didn't work out well. But they essentially voted for a major. So within the Italian parliament, they had a relief package that they're putting together to help deal, help kind of Italian citizens deal with the impacts of inflation. And this coalition member party was upset because of a proposed waste incinerator within Rome. So I don't know if this is around emissions, is this around? Were just kind of where it was being built, whatever. So basically Draghi thought he had a governing coalition that these guys were on board. And because they abstained from voting, he saw that there was no way that they could pass anymore of the proposed legislation. So he resigned. They get rid of it. What's that? Why couldn't they just get rid of the waste? Yeah, I don't know why this part was so critical. I don't know how the negotiation processes work, but whatever it was, I think it was recognized that the coalition was weak. And this is just the straw that broke the camel's back. So as a result, they have a spot election September 25th. And all the headlines lately have focused on the fact that the hard right coalition, which is led by a party called the Brothers of Italy, which actually grew out of the death of the Fascist Party of Mussolini. This party has about 45% and it's held together and it consists of the Nationalist Northern League and then Berlusconi, famous for his Booga Booga parties and Donald Trump before Donald Trump and his party. So they've essentially formed a very strong coalition, have about 45% of the vote. The center left is just too fragmented to form any sort of coalition. So it seems almost they've done deal that this party will be elected. The hard right coalition has already agreed whichever party within their coalition wins the highest percentage of vote would be the prime minister. And that is looking like the Brothers of Italy leader, which is Giorgia Meloni. So this would be the first female prime minister to be elected in Italy. I think the only issue is because she is heading up this used to be Fascist Party. So I think this is kind of the interesting part. A lot of the controversy is around what they've said previously. So they've been very kind of anti EU statements and they also the symbol of their party is a flame emblem, which actually represents the flame at Mussolini's tomb. And that's when the party was founded, I guess in the 1950s. Then I found it disturbing that Mussolini had a tomb with a flame that maybe Italy isn't fully because Hitler doesn't have a sort of marking for his. I think Mussolini never had the kind of evil aspect in Italy. And he didn't rule like Hitler either as much. He did. Yeah. He wasn't focused on the genocide and the racial clinic. He just wanted like territory. Right. And all the other fascist. I mean, he was the original Fascist, but the idea of kind of military rule. Right. But he was way more interested in that. So I think to Italians, you know, you didn't have this major ethnic cleansing. See, it is more of an emperor and kind of a strong man. But some, you know, even after the wars, there was still support from Mussolini because he made the trains run on time. He made the economy, you know, but they were struggling. I'm just saying that's true. So it doesn't completely surprise me. Yeah. He was also dragged through the street and home in the square. So I'm just still a little surprised. Nevertheless, okay. So they say, yeah, there's this controversy surrounding the Brothers Italy Party. But what happened this week was interesting because, you know, she came out very publicly, did a press conference, spoken three different languages, basically trying to assure financial markets because they reacted very poorly to the idea that this hard right coalition with poor governing experience was going to back out of this 200 billion euro deal by not doing the reforms, by leaving the EU. So they've basically come together and Politico reported on it. And all the anti EU sentiment is gone because the experience from COVID is Italians are very much in terms of polling, very much in support of EU and staying in the EU, supporting the Ukraine, all these sort of issues. I found overall a lot more positive than the headlines. I mean, there's no telling how they're governed. But in terms of the message that they're having to send and being forced to send because of the financial ties to the EU and the dependence on like this aid package and in previous times how badly the financial markets punished Italy that they're almost constrained externally with their rhetoric. Now, whether that results in different governing, I don't know, but I found it real interesting she came out so publicly with this announcement. Yeah. And that's what I was reading about that. I mean, I think it is interesting how that has definitely been one of Italy's struggles. So it does not like the austerity the German central bank has imposed on it as with other financially struggling countries. It also is propped up by being a part of the EU. Because before it became a member of the EU, there was a lot of financial mistrust. They could not get the same kind of investments that they got after joining the EU. So it would be a much bigger disaster from them. It's really untenable for them to leave the EU. And just as you're talking about the situation though that's being reacted to is the inflation rate is much, much higher in Italy than what the US experienced and the rest of Europe experienced. I know it's in the double digits. I can't remember. So their economy is really suffering. And that's sort of in the context of all this that is going on. Yeah. So, you know, I found assured because when you read the headlines, you're like, okay, this proto fascist party is going to get elected. That's going to threaten the whole unity around kind of Ukraine policy could threaten the whole EU if they're looking to push out. But no, they seem at least in terms of the rhetoric that they're communicating very constrained by all these situations with around the economy. Yeah. No, that's good news. In some sense, there's good news in the Kenyan election as well. Now, you may wonder why care about the Kenyan election, but Africa doesn't have a lot of strong democracies and Kenya is East Africa's most robust democracy. The three presidents in a row have accepted two term limit. These elections, though, still have had controversies. 2007 election resulted in 1400 deaths. The 2017 electoral commission handled it so poorly that the Supreme Court ordered it to be run. They've invested 370 million to bring in more secure ballots from Europe and use biometric technology to ID voters. But the fact that it's a dead heat election instead of supporting the incumbent sees choice, the previous president has chosen Ralia Odinga as his choice to run the presidency. He's been a five time presidential candidate. Both candidates have been around forever. The other challenger is William Ruto. So normally you would see elections in the incumbent see favor, the incumbent sees party. Yeah. I mean, I think what's interesting about this is that so Odinga had run previously in opposition to the party that's currently in power five times. He'd lost fairly narrowly, but he completely changed his tactics in this run and actually allied himself with the current term limited president Uhura Kenyatta. But you know, obviously William Ruto, the current vice president who says running against him is presumably part of that same party that the term limited president Kenyatta is in. So it's kind of an interesting arrangement. I think it may say party lines are not as fixed as they are. Yeah. I think so. Yeah. Yeah. So I guess I'm just coming from such an American perspective. It's just it's almost like an intro party. Right. But I think they're not just, yeah, I think they're not as delineated as clearly as they are. Yeah. Interestingly, Odinga did this tactic mostly to secure the votes of the largest ethnic group within Kenya, which is the Kikuyu of which the current president, the outgoing president, Kenyatta is kind of its most famous member, but he ended up only securing like 20% of the Kikuyu vote because people were so dissatisfied with the current president, outgoing president Kenyatta is like self dealing and corruption. And I think this was also seen as a positive sign for Kenya's democracy because it wasn't so ethnically tied because normally is so tied to the ethnic group that they came from. You had this guy who turned against even though the most famous, most powerful member of this ethnic group said, hey, vote for Odinga. Only 20% of them did so. Right. And I think the corruption issue comes up in my interview with Joe because talk about how a lot of countries with democracies are really unsatisfied with those democracies because of corruption. And that's just, it's a big issue. Corruption is yeah, a huge issue in Africa. And it hurts sometimes support for democracy in the countries that already have it. But it's a huge concern in the South African case, which I just discuss in detail with Joe because yeah, they're not seeing the representation. They're just seeing the people, it's just an avenue for corruption. And they're not seeing the economic development and political developments that they expect from those governments. So it's a huge problem. Do you have any further comments? Yeah. So I mean, it'll be the vote itself is basically tied at 49% to 49%. They spent all that money. They tried to be a lot more transparent around the election results, publishing them online, which was kind of a first for Kenya. However, it led to some confusion because all the different news agencies are essentially counting them and ordering them like in different ways. So depending on what channel you were watching, you're getting different results. So it has resulted in a lot of confusion, a lot of anger. But ultimately they hope by this, by tomorrow, by Sunday that they should have an idea of the somebody got a 50% in order to declare. Otherwise, I guess it'll be another runoff. Yeah. And since they've both been around for a while, no one really expected a huge difference in policies from who won. So the big thing here is the healthiness of the elections itself. And so it's definitely a positive thing. It's gone better than what people expected. Yeah. Yeah, for sure. So as we start to talk about my interview with Joe, I wanted to first talk about the non-alignment movement, which South Africa is one of the leaders of. And the non-alignment movement, which we talked about a little bit here, although maybe not so formally, but these are democratic and not democratic countries who do not intend to side with either superpower. And they really have upended this idea that the Russia-Ukraine war is about autocracy versus democracy since there are so many democracies that are part of this movement. I mean, I think it's really important to know is one of the reasons that they feel this way is they feel like there have been such double standards imposed against them, and they don't think the current international system is fair. So South Africa considers the regime change rhetoric used by the West, whether in Iraq or Libya, as highly problematic and a violation of state sovereignty. And even though they have insisted that regime change is not its aim against Russia, they view it with skepticism, although they have not called that Russia for its objective of moving the current government in Kiev. To not be aligned, though, doesn't mean that they support Russia. And I'm focusing on South Africa because they're one of the biggest of these countries. And we're talking about Africa because India is another one. But it also sees the West arrogance and imperious behavior and ignoring the concerns of developing countries on issues such as vaccine access or trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights waiver. The West has stolen a lot of intellectual property from Africa on many issues, including agricultural. And migration and the treatment of African migrants also in the early days of the war, the Ukrainian border, is another sore point. There were a lot of Africans in general who were living in Ukraine, who were treated very poorly as they were trying to escape the country as well. So I just think it's important to kind of have these sort of contexts when we wonder about and we try to pressure these countries in siding with us against Russia, just how they think the West itself and the Western coalition supports very unfair treatment of countries. And while they don't support Russia's actions, so really hesitant to ally themselves with the West and want to pursue an independent strategy that where their concerns have to be taken into more into account. So it also kind of gives them leverage, too. Like you actually need us. You can't just ignore us and you can't just expect us to go along with whatever you think the right thing is. Yeah, I fully agree. I mean, I think it's definitely in their national interest to play both sides. But I mean, to get the advantages from each in terms of investment, in terms of aid, in terms of whatever, to not emit or isolate themselves from one, because their future development depends on both. Exactly. And they have a lot of legitimate complaints that are never addressed. I mean, there's one, the intellectual property, but there's also the way that vaccines were distributed and African countries largely got them last. So they have many issues that the West should be trying harder to address if they expect that support. And as we've said, sometimes it doesn't make sense for them to choose between one or the other because they just pursue on a purely interest-based. So that kind of goes a little bit with the China issue, too. I don't know how much we addressed this specifically, but I was reading an article that Joe had written in the monkey cage. And just this idea that any people have talked about, well, China is so involved in the region, is that undermining the support for democracy? And basically, the finding was no, that even when Africans say that they prefer China's developmental model, that they still, they're not thinking so much in governance, but as more in economics. And they're just as likely to favor the US model for express support of democracy elections. I think that's really important. Even people who think China's influence in the region are very positive also see US influence very positive. So those were just a couple of points that I wanted to mention before we go into the interview itself. Okay, so here it is. Enjoy. I'm here with Joseph Asunka, who is the CEO of Afrobarometer. He was previously program officer at the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation in California, where he managed a portfolio of grants that support efforts to increase transparency and accountability in fiscal governance and foster citizen participation to improve public services in Africa. He received his PhD in political science from UCLA and has published in several prestigious journals, including the British Journal of Political Science and the Journal of Modern African Studies, amongst others. Hello, Joe. It's a pleasure to welcome you to the show. Hi, Anita. It's really great to be here. Nice to connect with you. Yeah, thank you. So on the show, the issue of democracy has been raised in many forms, particularly in the way that is being used by the Biden administration and the West as a new ideological battle of democracies versus autocracies in geopolitics. And I believe we may share some of the same views on this topic. But before we get to that, your work focuses on citizen engagement and democracy and brings a much needed perspective that we have not discussed before. I'm also so happy to have someone who can share their insights on Africa, a diverse region that does not get as much attention as it should. So to begin with, could you describe what the Afrobarometer is? All right. Thanks. Thanks so much for the opportunity. And thank you for giving me this platform to share about Afrobarometer. So the Afrobarometer is a public attitude survey organization that works in about 40 countries across the African continent. And as the name suggests, the barometer, we engage in the temperature of the continent in terms of people's experiences of governance, the economy, social life, and everything that has to do with basic living on the continent. And we do this regularly. We do it almost every two years. We go to all the 40 countries and we survey a representative sample in each country and we get the opinions of citizens. The main purpose is to ensure that people's voices are part of the democratic project. Because when Africa started democratizing from the late 1980s through the early 1990s, we thought that citizen voice needed to be part of this debate. Otherwise, the democratic project will just become an elite project. And if we leave citizens behind, then we don't have a democracy. And so the Afrobarometer was set up to ensure that people's voices are part of the debates and that we consistently collect their views, their experiences, their aspirations, and bring them to the table of policymakers to ensure that any decision they make about democracy, the institutions of democracy, that people's voices are part of that decision-making process. Yeah, I think that is such an invaluable service. And I can't even imagine the scale of trying to put that together 40 countries. I think in some ways you answered this question, but I wonder if you could elaborate some on how these surveys empower citizens in the democratization process. All right. So just to probably use myself as an anecdote, I always say that when I grew up in Purogana, in those times, governments seemed so far away from people. Like, we never had the opportunity to engage government in any form. All we knew was government came around to collect taxes from our parents, and that was it. But then what the Afrobarometer has done to try to bridge that gap, especially for rural folks in Africa, often the debates are in the capital cities. And then if you're lucky, maybe in the few other major cities in the country. But beyond that, in the hinterland, where majority of the African populace reside, it's hardly the case that they actually get to engage or even have an opportunity to provide feedback to governments in terms of what they're doing. And even generally, from their views about democracy and democratization. And as I mentioned at the beginning, bringing people along is critical. And so I see this project as trying to leave my own childhood dream, create opportunity for people who don't have access to government to share their experiences with governments. Sometimes just to vent their anger at government, because when you lack access to resources and you get the opportunity to express yourself, it does create that channel for the citizens to be part of the democratic project. And I think that's where the empowerment comes in. We give people their voices. And we elevate those voices to decision making fora in which they themselves can never dream of actually reaching. And so I think that is a channel through which we empower citizens on the continent, especially rural folks and rural women in particular, to make sure that their voices are heard. Yeah, I think that's great and amazing. And I love how you are working directly to bring the voice of the citizens. I know so much when we're talking about, even when we're studying and talking about democratization, it tends to be such an elite conversation. And I think it is so invaluable. And I think in every sense, people want to be able to have that sort of connection to the government. I mean, especially as you were saying in your childhood, if a government is supposed to be a democracy and represent you, then you have to know that they are hearing your voices. So the next question I wanted to ask you was about the summit for democracy in December of 2021 that Biden hosted. So what is your assessment of Biden's initiatives then and broader? And have there been any concrete actions that have come out of it? Right, yeah. Thanks for this. And we at Afrobarometer were actually invited to be part of a civil society platform on the Summit for Democracy. I think the idea behind it makes sense because we are in a stage in our democratization program that's a project where it looks like democracy is slipping gradually from just in front of us. And I say this because some of the democratic norms that you believe that even if we don't legislate on them, that there are certain practices that people suggest under democracy practice. You don't have to think that it is a law and that's why you are committing to it. But that is just a norm. But we've seen that some of those norms are being eroded every now and then. And the wind is blowing across the entire world. It's just not one region. In Africa, of course, we have had bigger concerns because democracy is yet to take roots. And then if this wave comes in, then it's just going to output the little that we already have. And I think that's a big concern. And I think that the summit was, the spirit of the summit was in the right place to bring together countries at different levels of democracy that can discuss issues, share their experiences and make some commitments in terms of how they want to go more forward to improve their own democratic projects. So first of all, I think in terms of the value of the summit, I think it was valuable. I think the concept itself made sense. And if this can continue and you can bring together a group of democracies and democratizing countries that can work together to learn from each other and improve, it can make a lot of difference because peer pressure can drive some change in some countries. I think the challenge with the summit is that it's slightly optional. So, for example, countries were expected to make some commitments at the end of the summit and then to begin to roll out plans in terms of how they are going to implement some of the commitments they made at the summit. I think, first of all, some countries that even submit in the commitments. And I think there's the voluntary nature of it. So governments had to volunteer and submit their own commitments. And then secondly, of course, this year of action, where now the commitments translate into action. But of course, for countries that never submitted any commitments, there's really no action to follow. And so I think that's where the mission link was, how we ended up with a summit that concluded with some countries really not submitting any commitments and post the summit. We still haven't seen some of those commitments. And I'm speaking specifically for Africa because for most of the countries on the continent, it's only a few handful that have actually submitted commitments. And for us in civil society, what we hope is that when governments submit some of these commitments, it provides us some hooks to hold them accountable. But now if they haven't submitted, then we don't have a way to hold them accountable. And I think that's where they got the light. I think that's so important. So what do you think the role in general of the international community should be in supporting democracy in Africa? All right. So first of all, just to say the Afro-Brahmi, as we collect this data, we've been doing this for more than 20 years now. And increasingly, Africans are deeply committed to democracy. So we hear cries about democratic black backsliding, democratic decline across the world. That is true to some extent. But if you are looking at democracy, it's not just the supply side. Well, look at the demand side. Because it is not the case that even though there's a sense of governments really not committed to supplying the democratic norms that citizens want. On the African continent, at least, lots, the majority of citizens are still solidly committed to democracy. When we ask people about their support for democracy, we have a clear majority, almost close to seven in 10 Africans say they will prefer democracy to all other forms of government. And when we want to reinforce their commitment to democracy, we ask about other alternatives. So one party rule, strongman rule, military rule. And across the board, Africans almost close to eight in 10 would say that they don't support any of these other alternatives. And especially when it comes to democratic norms, presidential term limits, elections as a mechanism for choosing leaders, their president being subject to the rule of law, and that parliament should exercise oversight over the executive. These are the norms that Africans want. And so when it comes to the demand side of democracy, it's very solid and strong. It hasn't, we have never had a minority view in a way. It is a supply side. Governments not living up to their expectations. And I think that's where the gap lies. And so you talk about just in general, look another democratic project on the continent. We do feel like we've gotten to a point where citizens have tested democracy. They lost the concept, the loved norms that come with it. They are yearning for their government to deliver on that front. But the governments have not been forthcoming. And that's where we see the democratic deficit and hoping the government should do better on that front. I mean, do you think the international community in general can aid that in any way? Or is this still, yeah, how do we put, can the international community and other countries find a way to put some pressure on these governments to at least create more accountable systems? Right. So there are a couple of things that I'll talk about here. First of all, of course, all the democracies, recognizing that democracy is really an ongoing project that's really hard and any country can lose it. And so just being humble, I mean, let me take the United States, for example, because it has also gone through its own challenges and knows that this thing called democracy can easily slip if you don't take time. And so the international community, especially the US government, having the humility to recognize that this is a hard job, but we still need to do it because that's what the citizens want. The second point of it is just making it clear that democracy and development are not attention because sometimes people say if you want to have freedoms, then maybe you can't have economic development. There is no evidence to show that the two are in opposition in any way because people having freedoms does not prevent a country from growing. And so on one swoop, I think of it in terms of just the moral support as a message and the second piece of it, the financial support to governments who are struggling to really put in the systems that they can use to ensure that they abide by democratic norms. Example, if you come to anti-corruption agents, offices of special prosecution, you talk of the procurement systems and how to implement maybe electronic based procurement system that takes the human element away and can reduce levels of corruption. And so any support, whether it is financial, logistical, material, that can help African governments to build systems that can take care of corrupt practices. I think that would be critical. My council revenue collection, how do we help African governments to mobilize revenues internally? It could be technology based approaches to revenue mobilization that can allow them to handle domestic revenues. And I say this because when we ask Africans about paying taxes, majority of Africans prefer that their development should come from their own resources. They don't want to rely on external resources. But how do you pay the systems that ensures that people pay their taxes and that the taxes don't leak through the system? International community can help with helping African government to think through what systems can we put in place to enhance revenue collection and limit the leakage of public resources in the system. Yeah. I think that's really definitely important. So how do Africans view the rhetoric that pits the world as autocracy versus democracy? Or in other words, China versus the US and the West? And does it affect the political environment, making it more or less conducive to democratization? I think that's the thing. What looks like some global geopolitical fight on autocracy versus democracy and the struggles of who would win the day. I think it doesn't help at all. It doesn't help because especially when it comes to Africa, people want democracy. But then when democracy doesn't deliver the economic goods, then it becomes a challenge. And that is where people can easily point to China to say that China doesn't have democracy, but they are doing well and they can grow. So it means that you don't necessarily need democracy to grow. And so I think that international engagement where it's always China versus US and they think in that case it kind of struggle by governance system is completely unhelpful, especially on the African continent. I hope the governments will do and I know that in the Biden administration at some point, especially Secretary Blinken had made mention of when they are engaging Africa, they are engaging Africa as Africa and not because of China. And I think that should be the thing. You're engaging the continent, you're engaging countries on the continent for a purpose. It's not because you want to fight China in Africa. Because if you, in the African context, when it comes to economic issues, Africans see the US and China as beneficial, like they benefit from both. China provides a lot of infrastructure. And so what is it then not to be happy about? But then it would help a lot if, you know, Western or the US engagement with Africa is focused on the engagement with Africa as opposed to a fight between autocracies and democracies. And as I said, you can always point to an autocracy that has done well and a democracy that is doing well. And so the question is, if you are using that as a basis for promoting democracy, it won't help anybody at all. Of course, in Africa we've had several autocracies that have been left after expectation. I mean, presidents have been in power for 30, 40 years and their countries have emote. So it's not necessarily the case that autocracies do better when it comes to economic development. So I do think as we approach, you know, democratization on the continent, the normative values, the values of democracy is something that people appreciate. It's not just the economic benefits because people want to be free. They want to be able to express themselves. They want to be able to walk around without being afraid of anything. That's something that happened to them. They want to be able to have access to clean water, electricity, all these, I mean, it comes as a package, but the values of democracy of freedoms and liberties and the like is what people really want. I mean, it's all part of the governance system. But if we pit autocracy against democracy, I think it makes it harder to then promote it because people don't think that it's the basis for economic development. Yeah. So a few points that I wanted to echo. One, I completely agree with you. I'm very critical of this sort of rhetoric and dialogue and whether that is helpful. And one thing that I just pointed out, but I think I heard you elaborate a little bit more on it and a different talk I was listening to you, is that how many people have positive attitudes towards the United States, but also China and how those aren't mutually exclusive things like people aren't deciding, oh, I can like China or I can like the United States, but appreciate both. And that's something in particular that I talk about because I feel like countries don't want to have to choose. Why should they have to choose if both are important to them in different ways? And to what you were saying, I was definitely thinking too, like instead of making it about this war, like it's the values that we just need to keep, I think, focusing on and have confidence. As you said, the people are very supportive of them and have confidence that those are more appealing to the United States. On the other hand, there is, I understand some frustration about the people want democracy, but China offers a way for maybe governments to resist that and for the governments themselves to look to China as a model of maybe how to stay in power and not have to answer to democratic norms. Do you think that's true or? Right, maybe a couple of points there. First of all, in the case of the United States and China, the thing that African countries should choose between the two, or if you don't choose the US way, then it would not love you, it would hit you for not coming. It can create that sense that if you don't hate China, then you don't love the United States, which shouldn't be the case. And as you rightly pointed out, there's no reason to choose between China and the United States. And our surveys do show people admire China's economic model. Some extent because there's growth, fast growth, and people benefit from that growth to some extent. And so there's that sense. But what people forget is it's not necessarily the governance model of China that Africa is once. It's an economic piece of it. And of course, you can buy a phone in the streets of Nairobi for less than $30. Thanks to China, we call it. They can produce such material that Africans can afford. I mean, you certainly can get a phone made in the US that will cost less than several hundreds of dollars. And so I think that's where they can be the choice that I choose this. And if I don't choose you, then I hate the other. That shouldn't be the case. The second component of it is, yes, China's approach to development can sometimes reinforce corruption. And that is where the emphasis should be. And it is also the case that Africans, citizens do want to see corruption reduced. So in an effort that aims at reducing corruption, if even that means doing something to counter the effects of China's impact on corruption on the continent, it's something that lots of Africans would be more than happy to engage in. And so I do think it's one thing to think of China as a competitor, but not to see it as Africans should have a choice between China and the West. Yeah. Yeah, I still agree with that. Right? We're in many ways competing and we're competing in values too, but I think it's really problematic the way that we are. Yes, if you choose to continue business with China, then you're not on our side. One thing I've always loved about you is you always have a sense of optimism around you. And I love that you can bring that to me now because it's hard sometimes in our discussions. We're always like, well, what's the positive spin on this? And lately there hasn't been like there was. So keeping that kind of on that topic of optimism and seeing things as better in Africa. I mean, I think from the outside sometimes it doesn't seem like that. So I'm thinking of like the overthrow of the elected government and Mali by the government to, you know, said they were going to transition to civilian government by now, but are postponing it again to 2024. And it's not looking very likely. And then yesterday I was reading about Tunisia supposed to be the one success story of the Arab Spring Uprising. I believe kind of where it started and how they just passed a constitution that gives the president almost absolute powers. So do you feel like that's a minority? And where do you find your sorts of optimism for democracy in Africa? Right, I think there are optimism lies in people's confidence in democracy and their absolute onflint and support for democratic norms on the continent. So I mentioned about, you know, Mali or Ghana, Kenya, or other places. It is all driven by the fact that people are yearning for democratic governance. And so even in Mali where there has been this postponement, you can be sure that it won't take long before Mali has started to hit the streets to protest. Because even though they would welcome an intervention to kick out these bad guys, they want you to not stay long enough. You should now return to democratic rule. And that's where my optimism lies, that people will always come back with a vengeance if you don't do what they're looking for. I think you make such good points about the citizens demanding more. One thing that I also heard you speak about the one place that I don't understand very much what's going on, but whether there might be some democratic issues too is South Africa. And so I believe you mentioned how attitudes towards democracy, that's the one country where they were kind of going backwards a bit. Did I get that wrong? Or do you have any insights on that? Yes, that sort of a case, one of the counters where we really have lots of concerns about the indicators that we often track over time, like perceptions about corruption in the presidency, in our trust in public institutions, democratic institutions and the like. When we did our survey in April, I think it was March, April, 2020 in Mali, we saw all these indicators pointing in the wrong direction. They were all going down. People thought the counter was going the wrong direction. The economy was not doing well in their view. They didn't trust the president and they thought corruption was increasing in the presidency. And it didn't take long. Five months later, the coup happened. And now we are seeing the same signals in South Africa that things are just going down and down, even to the point where support for democracy has become a minority view in South Africa, which is very, very risky. I mean, we've never recorded that in the history of the Afro-Barometer. And so we're really concerned about what might happen to South Africa because we are not sure what will happen to the ANC as a party, whether to continue to exist as it is, and how I fit to implode. And if it implodes, what does that mean for South Africa? So there are lots of concerns about South Africa. And I think Afro-Barometer data do point to some risky events that we don't know what they will look like. But then, of course, this is why we do the Afro-Barometer. So the L-O-1S signals can be used as a mechanism for engaging the South African government. Yeah, the Afro-Barometer is so important. I love that. And maybe I hadn't even really thought about where you could see the signals. I know even when I speak, I am not nearly as humble as I should be. And I think not just the US, but I think this idea of the West, we can be very arrogant. We created these values and the systems, and we don't try to learn enough. We don't listen enough. So what do you think citizens in the West and the United States can learn from the democratization work that's being done in Africa so that we can bring that home to strengthen our democracies? Right. I mean, the first thing is, especially in the United States and in the West, in general, in our established democracies, that people shouldn't take it for granted. Because what are the African citizens have experienced in terms of autocratic growth, all the way from colonial governments through to democratization, and somehow falling back into autocracies? People know the painful experience of going through, you know, are being ruled by an autocrat. And citizens of the United States take this for granted because they've always lived under a democracy. If this should slip away, whether or not the United States can stay as a United States would be in question. And I think this is the risk that, you know, it's almost like an existential risk for the United States that people may become so complacent, so not involved. I mean, like a 10-hour rates are all going down and people become extremely not interested in the political process. But then if you then do that and allow your democracy to slip into a point where there's not much that you can do again, that is where you would say, and African citizens have really experienced this, and this is not something they want to see. And I hope the United States doesn't become overly complacent about it. Me too. Well, thank you so much for this conversation. It was so great to connect with you and talk to you and get your perspective. You always bring so much to the table. And I thank you so much for being on the show. Thank you so much for having me, and I really love your shows. Keep it up. It's making waves around, and I'm sharing it with my colleagues. Really, thank you so much. Oh, thank you. We love to hear that. Take care. You too. Take care. So what do you think? Yeah, I thought it was a really interesting conversation. I love the work that he's doing around the survey. I found that really interesting, and the idea of how he views as being so critical to supporting democracy as the survey itself as a way to connect these people living in more rural regions outside of the capital cities or kind of the elite live and govern, connecting them to the government and being able to have a voice and kind of a small way around how things are going within these 40 African countries. So yeah, I found that. And then I found it encouraging how what large majorities in those polls support democracy like around 70%. I mean, that's really encouraging. Yeah, I agree with all those. I mean, I've really found it striking how positive he was because about democracy in Africa is if you look at the freedom index that measures the degree of democracy on a zero to 100 scale like China is at number nine. Africa scores very, very poorly. And I think there's like seven fully fledged democracies in Africa. And because of Mali and Tunisia backtracking, going more back to the pre-April spring and more authoritarian by the military or by the now leader of Tunisia, you know, a lot of people have a very dismal view of it. But like he just pointed out all the really positive aspects that you see about people wanting democracy and demanding more of it and responsiveness from their governments. And I think it's a lot more nuance to those numbers that you see. I mean, everything measures something different, right? I mean, and that might sound obvious, but it's important to keep in mind. So this detailed measuring different attitudes, it reveals a totally different picture, but a complimentary picture that people should take into mind. So I really was pretty a little surprised by the optimism and it made me feel more optimistically about the direction Africa is taking. Yeah. No, I mean, that was definitely encouraging. I like the way they framed it on the demand for democracy was high, but, you know, it's kind of a supply issue from the governments themselves. This is hard. Which makes it any, I think, you know, you fully acknowledge that, I mean, Africa, it's a series of young democracies. So they're really at the beginning stage of this process, but that with these sort of attitudes, the long-term growth of democracy seems real positive. I mean, certainly the way that he framed it. Yeah. I was shocked by how fragile South African democracy came across, because that's the oldest democracy in Africa. And I knew that there was some significant backtracking, that there had been some weakened democracy in the recent presidency. There's Zulu, I think, but I didn't realize how bad the situation was. And so I hope we don't see the sort of end of democracy in South Africa, which he predicts could happen because of those indicators. Yeah. That was really interesting. Yeah. The parallels between Mali and then seeing those same sort of trending indicators in South Africa. Yeah. And the last thing that, as I was listening to again, that really caught my attention too, Justin, because we also, we often talk about what is better for Africa. It's Chinese investment better. Is the US investment better? The US pretends it's no strings attached, but that's not actually true. Western investment, like China, has a lot of strings attached and how you run your country, whereas Chinese investment has strings attached and how you pay them back largely. But I was struck because he said Africans would rather use their own resources. They would rather not have to rely on outsourced side investment. But the problem is people don't pay their taxes. So you can't use your own resource if no one is going to give up taxes. Yeah. And obviously the income inequality in most African nations is pretty extreme. So it's really the elites aren't willing to, which is a very common. I'm thinking like Columbia, for instance, and some of the reforms they're attempting there. But yeah, that's always an issue is the tax collection and then the compromise, the corruption existing within the government that prevents that being effective. Right. And though, as Joe can always find some optimistic silver lining about the way technology could be employed to reduce corruption, I thought was interesting. And I guess to some extent you're even seeing this and the election and Kenya this week. Very impressive how they pulled that together. I've spent time in Nigeria. The infrastructure around that isn't always the most reliable, especially like internet connection and things like that. But I know a lot of the cases and the point that he made was all these, the fact that China has this amazing manufacturing ability, they can pump out these cheap products. Africa essentially kind of leapfrogged that traditional and ground infrastructure. And a lot of their banking systems based on phones, on mobile technology. And like he said, you can purchase a phone for $20, which is affordable for the average African. And that's how they get internet access and do banking and conduct all these, the trade index. And so I could see being optimistic around technology, especially maybe with the idea, I mean, we saw it with the Starlink, with the Ukraine, in fact, we're able to establish internet connection. If you can then delink it completely where it's like this satellite service. Right. And one of the interesting things is when I first started PhD program, when we were using metrics, like the amount of electricity and computer coverage were metrics for development. They were very underdeveloped in Africa. And so the difference in internet consumption once that became possible on cell phones is an enormous improvement. And was the change overnight was truly an overnight change that people had to catch up on. And I don't think you can overemphasize what it was like just 10, 15 years ago. And the difference is now in the ability to, what it means for education as well in all sorts of different ways. And that using this as a way to cut out middlemen, because the more people in the middle who are involved, the more they have to get their own take. The more it's out. Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. And I think that's stuck out to me and I hope everyone found it informative and interesting. Okay. So I think this wraps up the show. I think so. I think that's episode. Okay. Well, that brings us to the end of this episode of Kellogg's Global Politics. You can visit our website at www.kelloggsglobalpolitics.com and follow us on Twitter @globalkelloge or me, @arkellogg. You can also reach us by email, so anita@kelloggsglobalpolitics.com and myself, ryan@kelloggsglobalpolitics.com. And as always, please see the show notes for the articles we discussed in the episode and leave a rating and review on your favorite podcast provider. Thanks all. Thanks everybody. 

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