Kellogg's Global Politics

The North Korean Threat with David Maxwell

• Anita Kellogg

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On this episode, Anita speaks with David Maxwell, a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel, a Senior Advisor to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. We talk about the various ways North Korea presents a national security threat to the United States that goes beyond its nuclear weapons program. We also discuss resetting the goal to place unification with South Korea first led by an informational warfare campaign and then denuclearization rather than the current policy of denuclearization before unification. Dave warns that the U.S. and our partners need to be prepared for a period of violent instability if the Kim regime loses its iron grip on North Korean leadership. 

We begin the show by marking the one-year anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine war. We discuss the remarkable unity of the West, while the rest of the world has largely opted for neutrality—of which many of these countries are helping Russia’s economy survive. We look at the historical reasons the West has less influence on the Global South than it often presumes. Finally, we cover China’s 12-point plan for peace and whether China or India might have a role as neutral arbiters of peace.



Topics Discussed in this Episode

  • [03:40] Russia-Ukraine 1-year Later: Global South is Not on Board
  • [27:25] China’s Peace Plan: Self-serving Ploy or Useful Framework?
  • [36:15] Talking North Korea with David Maxwell


Articles and Resources Mentioned in Episode

Russia-Ukraine 1-year Later: Global South is Not on Board

China’s Peace Plan: Self-serving Ploy or Useful Framework?

Interview with David Maxwell


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Anita Kellogg: [00:00:00] Welcome to Kellogg's Global Politics, a podcast on current events in US foreign policy in international affairs. My name is Dr. Anita Kellogg, an international relation scholar specializing in the relationship between economics and national security. I'm here with my co-host, Ryan Kellogg, an expert in energy investment and policy.

Ryan Kellogg: Thanks and glad to be here. So this is episode 30 and we're recording this on February 26th, 2023. 

Anita Kellogg: On this episode, I speak with David Maxwell, a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel and a senior advisor to the Center for American Pacific Strategy, as well as a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation.

We talk about the various ways. North Korea presents a national security threat to the United States that goes beyond its nuclear weapons program. We also discussed resetting the goal to place unification with South Korea, first led by an [00:01:00] informational warfare campaign and then de-nuclearization, rather than the current policy of de-nuclearization first and then unification.

Dave warns that the US and our partners need to be prepared for a period of violent instability. If the Kim regime loses its iron grip on North Korean leadership, we begin the show by marking the one year anniversary of the Russia, Ukraine War. We discuss the remarkable unity of the West while the rest of the world has largely opted for neutrality.

Of which many of these countries are helping Russia's economy survive. We look at the historic reasons the West has less influence on the global south than it often presumes. Finally, we cover China's 12 point plan for peace, and whether China or India might have a role as a neutral arbiter of peace.

All right, so we're recording this a week earlier than usual and a week earlier than you'll hear it because we wanted to still push out content while we are in India. [00:02:00] 

Ryan Kellogg: Right? Yeah, no, I think it's getting pretty professional of us . 

Anita Kellogg: I know. agree, but yeah. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. I mean, we're getting, we're getting geared up for, for the trip.

I mean it, it's feeling more real now, now that we're less than off the weekend out. Yeah. I'll know if we're ready. I mean, I think we. , we have all the clothes that we need now finally for the, for the whole wedding extravaganza. Mm-hmm. . But yeah, there's all the other elements. , I think too, the mentally get mentally prepared, putting aside, and we've both been very busy.

Mm-hmm. with a lot of other things. And then we're both going to be real busy after two weeks. It's also like taking two weeks off. That's not in the summer, so it's not a traditional vacation period. It's during our daughter's spring break. So it's just this little awkward interlude pretty early in the year.

So it's a little weird from that side of it, but I'm, I'm sure once we get there and we're like in it, we'll [00:03:00] enjoy it a lot. But yeah, I know we're both, you know, a little nervous about obligations after coming.

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. I try not to think about it because the trip is worth it, but it is going to be an intense week.

Getting back. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But definitely excited. It's something I think even Becca was saying, like we found out about it a year ago or maybe more. We've been planning it for a year, so it's one of those kind of trips. Then it's like, oh, it's now actually here. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yep. Yeah. So excited 

about 

that. 

Anita Kellogg: So if you're tired of hearing about India, I apologize, you're just going to have to skip to the next chapter because I'm pretty sure when we get back we'll be talking about India teams

All right. So we wanted to start by marking the year point of Russia, Ukraine, war, and talk some about how the world has not divided in the way that I think the West thought it. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yes. I think, you know, in terms of where we wanted to [00:04:00] focus, there's been a couple different articles that have come out in the last week marking the one year anniversary of the war.

And in particular, I think there's this assertion and, and certainly something that the Biden administration has emphasized is the idea that a global coalition has been built against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But in reality it's, and we've talked about this before in our previous episodes, it's a coalition of European countries, the Anglo sphere, so the US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and then a smattering of wealthy East Asian allies.

So in total, when we look at the, the map and the Economist put out a good map that, um, has been circulating on social media. It's only 33 nations out of 193 that have imposed sanctions and, and really provided [00:05:00] any sort of aid to Ukraine. And the reality is a lot of the global South has remained neutral and actually increased trade with Russia during this period.

And the way that it's viewed in, you know, a lot of it justified from a national interest perspective is it's, this is just another European where American problem. This isn't a problem about democracy or individual sovereignty or anything along those lines, but rather it's another regional problem. And there's a lot of reasons why citizens of the global south, why elites within the global south really resent the.

Idea of being pressured by the US administration or by European allies to come down one way or the other. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. I think part of the [00:06:00] western perspective is that, look, Russia invaded this sovereign country. You know, why wouldn't you be against that? Right? You don't want to set that precedence where it's okay for a country to invade another country.

But then I think when I say that, then the response tends to be, well, the US invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, and look at how that worked out. So I think for a lot of countries that look at it doesn't seem to me like that comparison is a good comparison. But I think through those in the global south, that's how they view it.

And I think we need to do more to listen to them, how they view things, and then recognize that we talk about the US leading the world. , but we don't maybe lead it, have as much influence as we think we do in many ways. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. And I, I, I don't think that's necessarily a new thing. I mean, I think a lot of that's been way overstated and we'll get into that later, but [00:07:00] Yeah, for sure.

I mean, I think how they view the hypocrisy of a Europe who took the lead, like in the invasion of Libya. Mm-hmm. and definitely the situation, particularly in Iraq. I mean, I think a lot of people, even the global South understand and, and the support the US had following nine 11 to go into Afghanistan initially was, was very high, but Iraq was opposed almost universally.

And actually in, uh, by a lot of our current allies and the struggle between Russia and Ukraine. So it is that hypocrisy that is seen of, well, if national sovereignty is so important, then why was it important? Then, so I think a lot of it is could we regain credibility within the global south by having a national reconciliation around Iraq in particular, and how much blowback would [00:08:00] result?

I, I don't think there would be a lot of blowback if the Biden administration came out and said Iraq was a horrible mistake. We were unjustified in the invasion. We used faulty intelligence to justify the invasion, and that obviously we can't commit to as a policy that, okay, we'll never take preemptive action again.

Mm-hmm. , but maybe we, we do to a certain say, I mean, we certainly haven't gained a lot in the conflicts we've been involved in. We're taken preemptive. Action to violate national sovereignty. This is what not, I'm saying, you know, none of our invasions have really worked out historically. I mean the, the earliest ones are more around colonialism, which is another big reason that the global south is skeptical particularly of Europe and its problems is they were subjugated by Europe for the better part of a century, and they have long memories and they're still resentful [00:09:00] of many of those countries.

I feel like in 

Anita Kellogg: international relations there is a subset that talks about post-colonialism, but I think the majority of it, when you're talking about realism and liberalism, we don't take into account enough the legacies of colonialism and how that affects decision making for the former colonial countries.

Yeah, like that's a real element that I don't think I recognized enough the importance of until seeing some of the responses. . I also just wanted to highlight, I had posted just a quick tweet about the article and I thought a couple replies to the tweet were just indicative of the sentiment that's in the global south.

So the first one, the non-Western world has no incentive to weigh in favor of the west. The west hasn't invested anything in cultivating the goodwill of the global south, and that's just really seems to me like, oh, this is seen as a war against the west in Russia [00:10:00] rather than a particular. Part of invading another country.

And so I just responded. That's a good summary of the article and our viewpoint is why you're not going to condemn a country that started war. Another territory. I wasn't arguing, I was just trying to say something, but there was enough. There was another reply that I just thought was interesting. And from a non-western perspective, it is just hypocrisy to say what the West does is for freedom and what Russia does is for tyranny.

At the end of the day, Iraq is not a paradise nor Afghanistan, north Syria, nor Libya. So that's kind of what we're saying. But I just thought like those were kind of representative of, of this viewpoints that we're talking about. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah, and I think one of the things that stood out when we look Pacific countries, and again going back to India, but I think India, probably one of the more interesting ones in this, given its unique history as well.

Mm-hmm. , so I don't think it should come as a surprise of people informed about Indian history, but during [00:11:00] most of the cohort war had very strong ties to the Soviet Union. It was seen much more as, as Allied with the Soviet Union we talked about previously and other episodes about how much the Indian military relies on Russian equipment.

Nearly 85, 90%. 

Anita Kellogg: Just real quick, something we didn't even necessarily note about that is that the borders between Indian and China are very militarized with troops on both sides, and they don't want to lose that connection to having Russian military equip. possibly. Yeah. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. So from this border general, just from a pure national security.

So that's kind of one element. But what I saw, and so there was, uh, and maybe we'll get into it a little bit later, but there is a tweet that was put out in response to the Chinese peace plan around India taking the lead in a potential negotiated solution. So this was Derek Grossman at [00:12:00] Rand, and some of the responses he got, I think were real telling and, and it ties into the, the hypocrisy.

But the thing that came up over and over again, which was not a historic event that I have a lot of knowledge of, but the 1971 Pakistani Indian War, and in that conflict, . The reason that India prevailed was, at least in the people's mind within India and these people responding to the Post, was the intervention of the Soviet Navy to support India.

And because of that, they have very fond memories because Pakistan particularly, when we talk about India today mm-hmm. , um, a place that has become increasingly focused on Hindu nationalism. Very much kind of a anti-Muslim attitude. Probably the greatest that's been seen within the country since the founding.

So anything involving kind of [00:13:00] Pakistan, anything involving mm-hmm , kind of resisting Pakistan takes on, you know, this great patriotic importance within many Indians minds that helps color A lot of the response too is the fact the Soviet Union backed India. I mean, not only did they militarily provide, you know, the equipment over time, but they also intervene this critical moment within the country's history.

Right. 

Anita Kellogg: I think that's important. And I knew about the war, I don't know about many other details in the conflict. I do know that when I started studying international relations forever ago, that you often had these clashes between Pakistan and India, and you would have these massive terrorist attacks inside India from Pakistan.

It's not something I think I've heard about very much in the last decade. So maybe things are stabilized, but I know that that conflict was very real and still very alive and is something that yeah, of course would shape the way India views own security arrangements and you know, just the role of memory, right?

Who helped us out [00:14:00] before. I think those things are really, really important and we tend to dismiss them. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah, so I think along those lines, I mean, another interesting one we saw last week is just this tie between Russia and South Africa. Mm-hmm. . So they actually, South Africa and Navy conducted a joint exercise in the Indian Ocean between both Russia and China.

Crazy. And this was, that's crazy. This was seen as pretty shocking by the us. I mean, I think to a certain extent the US understands India's position and has backed away well, we've from it, just because of the importance of India to the China. Yeah. Conundrum. But South Africa came really as a shock. And what, what surprised me, and this is to your point, kind of around both colonialism and history.

Trumping economics. Mm-hmm. . So the US is actually the number one trading partner with South Africa and the number one foreign investor within South Africa, and yet they take this very [00:15:00] provocative action. Now, the South African government pointed out, oh, we conducted naval exercises with the US last year.

But those were for emergency response and humanitarian needs, not for what they did with Russia and China for offensive capability. But that all goes back again to the Cold War and the fact that around apartheid, before the US finally came on board in the 1980s, it was the Soviet Union that supported the black nationalist trying to overthrow the white supremacist government that existed, the apartheid government that existed at the time.

And that has a long memory. So a lot of South African elites are currently in power, actually trained in schooled in the Soviet Union. Oh, wow. So they have these, these emotional ties, these historical ties that Trump even the fact that, yeah, you're going to, you what a, I guess a realist would say, your economic ties are greater with the United States of America.

Maybe you don't want anger the United States of America. [00:16:00] didn't matter. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. I mean, you're probably thinking, oh, well nothing will affect those ties, but you would expect them to have more influence over the decision making. And like I said, it's, it's really fascinating and it certainly has been enlightening to me to see the role of history play out the way it has.

I hadn't really thought about having those, being trained in Russia and of course knowing that then it's no surprise. And they, they take a lot of the decisions they have on Russia because if you literally were trained in Russia, then you would have certain feelings about it. I mean, I can definitely understand that.

Oh yeah. But it was still a really provocative action, I think, to hold those drills with Russia. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah, the timing of it around the first anniversary, I mean, it was a very big propaganda win for, for Russia to be able to point towards that. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, definitely. I think one thing that West has struggled with, and one thing that is definitely been a factor in Russia's economy, stabilizing and even as we [00:17:00] said, the I IMF projecting very, very modest growth has been the fact that the Western has held on sanctions, but no one else has really kind of joined it.

And so that's allowed Russia to get around a lot of the sanctions because other countries have made up for it in terms of mm-hmm. imports into Russia and unless the US war to impose secondary sanction. , then there's really no way to hurt the economy the way we would like it. Not that we're not damaging the economy, but to the extent that it hurts the, the warfare.

And so people, I saw Edward Fishman, who's been a very big proponent of sanctions, and I think even the think it was him on the oil cap, basically, that we need to go to that extent. We need to impose secondary sanctions. But I think the problem is geopolitical realities, right? And as much as I'm saying history, but geopolitical history is also a factor in why we allow India to have the stance.

We don't put more pressure on India, right? Mm-hmm. , like, we can't do [00:18:00] secondary sanctions unless we're going to impose them on India. Right? But we're not going to do that. We're not going to do that because we need India's partnership with counter China's influence. 

Ryan Kellogg: So I think, yeah. The, the final point that I, I wanted to cover was this whole framing of this.

Idea that the US the West once had great sway over the global south. Mm-hmm. , at any point that we, we've squandered, we're fallen from the mountain top. Mm-hmm. largely driven by the activities of the last 20 years. Mm-hmm. , so the disasters of Iraq in particular mm-hmm. , so downgrading our reputation within these countries that, you know, allowed Russia and China and I, I just find it very, a historical mm-hmm.

we're very kind of near term historical because I'm not sure the US West ever had this sort of unmitigated power that reports or articles seem to make. So I think this, this whole [00:19:00] idea is just real, very reminiscent of the Cold War and the non-aligned movement. And it's the same c. , it's that again, the historical ties to the Soviet Union, which had a global presence and mass influence within the global South.

So it's really Russia trading off of that legacy, even though ideologically they are the polar opposite, at least in theory of that, you know, they're more akin to a fascist regime rather than the Marxist one that at least the Soviet Union pretended to be mm-hmm. from an ideological standpoint. But they, they still have that.

And even when the US was, you know, at the apogee of its relative economic power. We did not have the ability to prevent some pretty catastrophic from the US' perspective, foreign policy disasters, things like the loss of China to the Communist Party, the whole Korean War, which split the peninsula or even the, yeah, the formation of the Eastern block.

Again, these, even though the U US was by far the most [00:20:00] powerful nation on the planet following World War ii, it still was not godlike in its ability to manipulate foreign affairs. And it's 

Anita Kellogg: just, I think you're going too far. I think this the sense of being triumphant over the Cold War, I think that's where you get America's feelings of power and that it dominated the influence of the world because there was no one who can.

Ryan Kellogg: So you're talking more the end of the Cold War, right? 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. And that's, and that's, and I think that's where people are coming from, not obviously after War, war ii, there are all these events that limited the US influence, and as long as the Cold War was going on, that limited the US' influence. But I think after the Cold War ended, it seemed like the triumphant of democracy, Western values.

And I feel like whether that was the reality or not, that's the actual period where that sentiment is coming from. Yeah. And I, I 

Ryan Kellogg: had that thought as well, but again, that was a historical and delusional, because the effects of the [00:21:00] Cold War never went away. The US still took these actions in order to battle global communism in the global south primarily.

And those actions all have consequences. They did not leave warm and fuzzy feelings within the global south following that period. 

Anita Kellogg: Right. I, yes, that's so I don't 

Ryan Kellogg: understand, I don't think this influence ever existed. The only place I percept think it has ever. Did seem to exist and it was more to the fact that the US accepted limitations on its power was the goal for, I think that to me in terms of a military international coalition expressly for the respect of sovereign borders and restoring those was the fact that the US put together a very broad across the global south supports, particularly in the Middle East, a global coalition to kick out the Iraqi army from Kuwait and then stopped after that mission was done.

That was the only period where it was like, okay, it seemed like the US had power, but it [00:22:00] also recognized its limits too. And I think that's the reason, maybe also the perception that had that influence, because it recognized it limits as well, but those limits always exist that the US isn't this, where it never was this hyper power that could just out and out dictate the only period where the West had that was colonialism where it literally controlled the governments of these nations.

Anita Kellogg: Right. While I think that's true, I just want to emphasize why we had that perspective because it wasn't just the end of the Cold War, it was all these countries who were now democratizing, who were taking on a capitalist system. And that seemed really powerful at the time. And all the way up to 2000, you had, you know, influence of the new trade agreements through the World Trade Organization.

So it felt like you were increasing. 

Ryan Kellogg: That was primarily Eastern Europe, and I would argue that Eastern Europe has been a massive success following the end of the 

Anita Kellogg: Cold War. Well think about, it's not just 

Ryan Kellogg: there. So it's still [00:23:00] a very Eurocentric point of view. Not really. You had 

Anita Kellogg: the global South Latin America where a lot of countries became more democratic.

You have parts of Africa, like South Africa, the end of apartheid during that period. Yeah, but 

Ryan Kellogg: that's separate. I mean, I don't, well, no, that's separate from the Cold War. It's separate, 

Anita Kellogg: but it happened at the same time. Yeah, yeah. That's what I'm saying. It just seemed, that's why Fu Gama wrote the history when capitalism is spreading and democracy is spreading, people felt like that was a sign of America and Western influence.

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. I think it all rests on the subset of economic prosperity and delivering on those things and that that system, or at least the way the countries that adopted it outside of maybe Eastern Europe, that it did not deliver the material promises. . 

Anita Kellogg: I agree. And I think that's why by 2000 you already saw a weakening of that.

So 2000 is when they tried to do the next rounds of trade talks. And so you may [00:24:00] remember some famous demonstrations that happened. Yeah. 

Ryan Kellogg: But that was, I mean, half of that was driven by backlash within developed countries. 

Anita Kellogg: Right? Yeah. Part of it was that, but a lot of it also was reason why stalled is because the global south wanted more favorable terms.

If they were going to give these terms, then they wanted open agricultural markets in the west. Right? These, these things are very heavily protected, whereas our comparative advantage in the global south. And so that's really been the point of why there's been no new trade agreements on a global scale is that conflict right there.

And you know, I think the West needs to think about this. I think they need to take seriously. Do they just accept they don't have influence? Do they worry about China having. in roads to influence in these areas because China was not a colonial power and has also set itself up to be a champion of the global south for these reasons.

Yeah, no, 

Ryan Kellogg: I think it is, and I [00:25:00] think how you approach it, how you manage it, you have to at least show up. When we talked about that a lot before and the engagements within Asia and within Africa showing up as a big part of it, but then coming clean. Yeah. About your history and particularly maybe the recent history.

Mm-hmm. , and that's something we haven't done as a nation around Iraq in particular, and then Europe's more of a mixed bag. I mean, I think Europeans have. as individual nation. The sovereigns apologized to a certain extent, emitted the ills of colonialism, but that hasn't necessarily resulted in any sort of material.

I mean, the global south would probably be compensation for the ills done to their society. And that's not going to be forthcoming, obviously. And I think it's really, it's used in Germany as a model. Mm-hmm. and the [00:26:00] Germans are really seen as a model of owning up to the most terrific thing that a nation state could do with the Nazi regime committed.

But they are recognized as, as zoning up to it and doing it in the right way. And I think there's probably a lot to learn from that. And that's how I would think you earn back credibility in places like India or south. . 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. I mean, we're not going to apologize for Iraq, but I think yeah, that would be good if we did that.

I think that could help a lot. I think usually Germany, but then Japan's also instructive because they didn't make that apology. Right, exactly. 

Ryan Kellogg: And that's still bitter point of contention in all of East Asia. I mean, and 

Anita Kellogg: Southeast Asia, you've seen more trade wars between South Korea and Japan. Mm-hmm. , then you have China and Japan.

Yeah. So it is interesting. I think the West needs to accept this and also consider ways that it, is it important to have influence? And if it is, then what [00:27:00] are the things that we can do about it? But the problem is how politically tenable they are. Right? Because I, they would involve either reparations or a favorable trade deal or something of that nature would be necessary to over overcome those historical memories.

So, . We also wanted to touch on the fact that China came out with a 12 point plan for peace this week that basically said the sovereignty of all nations should be upheld without mentioning either Russia or Ukraine. It condemns a Cold War mentality term that usually refers to the US and the us European Military Alliance, NATO.

But the other points of it call for a ceasefire. Peace talks, protection for prisoners of war, and stopping attacks on civilians without elaborating on that, as well as keeping nuclear power plants safe and facilitating grain exports. So everyone acknowledges this is very favorable to [00:28:00] Russia, which is unsurprising considering Russia and Chinese.

Weak alliance or alignment, I guess you're talking about 

Ryan Kellogg: endless friendship, , 

Anita Kellogg: but this is not like an alliance. I said Alliance first and Alliance is a more formal treaty, I suppose, but some sort of friendship alignment. So of course the terms would be more favorable to Russia. Interestingly, they did not talk about what it would look like if Russia would keep Crimea or not, but basically just these are.

they think needs to be done to get to a peace agreement. And I think there's a valid conversation to be had about whether China can be a neutral arbiter. You're shaking your head, so 

Ryan Kellogg: they say no. Absolutely not. I mean, they're clearly in the camp of Russia. Yeah. There are a couple non-controversial bullet points that Yes, peace is good.

Yes. Street, p o w as well. Yeah. We prefer that you not use nuclear weapons. Getting grain shipments out is a good thing for everybody, but everything else was self-serving. I mean, the swipes [00:29:00] against Cold War mentality, the Alliance, because they're, they know full well that between organizations like AUS and the Quad, that the noose is closing around Chinese ability to have this wolf warrior diplomacy and aggressive actions within the South China Sea.

So of course they're going to use that opportunity to push back against it, and it very much seems like, They want to freeze the current position on the battlefield in place by calling for immediate peace. And that leaves Russia with considerable territorial gains, which are absolutely unacceptable. So I think just this whole thing is fully self-serving.

And again, it's, but that being said, I think it's a very effective tool to pander to the global south. I mean, I think the idea of let's end this war, let's end these sanctions. That was the other big part. It was ending the sanctions, bringing down the sanctions against, against Russia. But there's keys getting rid of this highly inflationary environment and helping the economies of the global south.

China's interested in this. [00:30:00] So I think from that, from a propaganda perspective, very effective. 

Anita Kellogg: Okay. Well, let me offer a counterpoint, not that I disagree on anything that you said, but a counterpoint could be, Zelensky agreed that he would meet with China, and 

Ryan Kellogg: that's only because. You know, looking at the post-war period, China and they had, they had a lot of economic ties with China.

Maintaining those, maintaining those for the rebuilding process. Mm-hmm. for the huge amount, the hundreds of billions of dollars that need to be invested into Ukrainian infrastructure. He's got to do that. I think that's the smart thing. He's got to maintain those relations. He hates that the alliance with Russia is so tight.

He's given him a little 

Anita Kellogg: bit. Well, but maybe if they actually bring both sides to the table, which nobody has been able to do, then you begin a negotiation. 

Ryan Kellogg: I think you can find better parties. And that's why I did like, I mean maybe India's not that by, did like Derek Grossman tweet on. Yeah. What about India?

I think India is actually a much closer to being a [00:31:00] neutral, arbitrary, even though we talked about the, the ties with Russia and with support, but it's not providing the diplomatic cover that China is and potentially, you know, as we've seen with these reports, China may be providing lethal aid at some point.

Now we haven't seen that yet. 

Anita Kellogg: Every time I read this was first it was the Financial Times. This actually came from the Wall Street Journal. These are not the journals you wanted to take as the most credible and well now Wall 

Ryan Kellogg: Street Journal has a very good, um, investigative journalist aspect. Yeah. These are not as much as these is very respected.

Yeah. They're below the Washington Post to New York Times, but they're probably like three and four 

Anita Kellogg: maybe when it comes to economic side, but I don't think they're very good. Yeah. This economics , no. Defense industry's economics. Ft swore it and they had one source and they swore it was too. And then I actually went to have a seminar and I said, this is one source, and I got attacked.

[00:32:00] Like, no, this is happening. And we know it didn't 

Ryan Kellogg: happen. To your point, I think the last comments I heard, Biden directly or that, yeah, maybe it did not look like it was going to be the case that this support was going to materialize. But obviously there's, there's enough chatter out there. There's enough that the State Department of Blinken was, you know, very concerned, you know, made a big deal about, about entering the defense summit and Germany over the last week.

So there's potentially something there. But anyway, India I think is a better arbiter for it than China because I think it is truly a neutral, closest you can get to a neutral great power that maybe 

Anita Kellogg: could negotiate. One counterpoint is that, does India have the diplomatic capability of doing that? So India's never really had diplomacy in a large.

Do they have the expertise? Well, China doesn't , no, China does. I think what great 

Ryan Kellogg: piece has China ever 

Anita Kellogg: negotiated? China has very [00:33:00] strong diplomacy in a lot of various areas. They have now been negotiating 

Ryan Kellogg: belt and roads conflicting parties. 

Anita Kellogg: Okay. Well, not many have bad, I mean, I'm not asking for India to have that specific experience.

I'm saying they don't have nearly as much global diplomacy efforts. I mean, China has, you know, it has its own agreements, right? Where India has never taken the global stage in that way, and I just don't know if they have the 

Ryan Kellogg: ability. Yes, I think they have the ability to do it. The key is having the relationships between the two Warren parties and two Warren sides, and being seen as legitimate negotiator between the two Warren sides.

This is where I think they could potentially have that, and I think it's in the S'S interest. Again, looking strategically and wanting to boost the quad, boost the importance of India. You give India this diplomatic victory over a negotiated [00:34:00] solution. They're prestige in the world stage. That's good for the long term conflict with China and diminishing China's sad attempt 

Anita Kellogg: here.

I do question. I mean the capability issue, I think it's more than what you think it is. China's, oh man, listen, I was, 

Ryan Kellogg: I was reading, I was reading the retweets to Derek Grossman and this Hindu Nationalist Moody is a God, and he could do this. I understand. He's very capable. It's no problem . 

Anita Kellogg: I understand that, and I'm certainly not denigrating India in any way, but they haven't put deals together themselves.

No deals themselves have they initiated, and I think that's an important aspect of being able to put something together. 

Ryan Kellogg: I mean, what has China done? The 12 bullet points? I mean, there was no substance to it. I mean, they, I don't think it's that hard. I think it's really the trust that has to exist at a high level between both nations states, maybe.

Anita Kellogg: But does India have any ties to Ukraine? 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah, they, they do. I don't think it's the extent just because the other thing that Keith aim to [00:35:00] remember is the relative size of the economy of all these nations. So the United States 23 trillion economy. Yes. China 18 trillion. India's only 3 trillion. Yeah. He's still a small player.

So the economic ties aren't going to be as great with talk about Ukraine. Yeah, it is ultimately with Ukraine. But it's also, 

Anita Kellogg: but when you were talking about China, United States is called why Zelensky would agree to meet. With China. I mean you have to get both sides to be willing to even sit down at the table.

And does India have that influence? 

Ryan Kellogg: I don't think so, unless it was seen as really alienating of China. He has a very fine line to play in thinking about the post-war period and trying to do the best for his country. He wants to have good relations basically with everybody except for a Putin controlled Russia.

That's, I mean, I think the key aspect would be not alienate China if India were to take a lead in a piece of negotiation, but I think there's a lot to gain from a US perspective. Sure. Or something like that. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. I'm sure the US would like Fran to do that. I mean, it sounds like a great idea, [00:36:00] but I think those are the practical reasons why we won't see it happen.

Ryan Kellogg: I don't know. I liked it. It got a lot of engagement. We'll have it in our, our shoot notes. Yeah. 

Anita Kellogg: And I think, as we've said, we want maybe speak to him or some more, get some expertise on India, because we're very interested in the role it plays in the global sphere. All right. So, I had this great interview with David Maxwell about North Korea.

We had met and talked about Korean issues before, and I think North Korea is a topic that kind of gets chanted away. It seems impossible. The denuclearization has just not happened. We've tried different things, penalties. We had this whole big diplomatic push between Trump and Kim that went absolutely nowhere, and that was probably one of the few times you had this attention to it.

Yet, you know, we have 25,000 troops on the South Korean mainland, and you would think because of that maybe it would get more [00:37:00] attention, the close Alliance. But North Korea presents real security threats beyond nuclear weapons, as I've said, and I think he also makes some interesting points about the possibility of unification.

So I'll help you enjoy the interview. My name is Dr. Anita Kellogg, and I'm here with David Maxwell, who's a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel, and has spent more than 30 years in Asia as a practitioner specializing in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare.

He is a senior advisor to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. Hello, Dave. Welcome to the show. 

David Maxwell: Hello, Anita. It's great to be here. Thank you for having me. 

Anita Kellogg: I appreciate so much and bringing on kind of a new topic that we haven't discussed as much, but it's certainly something that is close to me, having spent so much time in South Korea.

So to begin with, [00:38:00] Last week, North Korea put on a military parade featuring its nuclear capabilities and intercontinental ballistic missiles received very little coverage in the United States. Instead, attention was understandably focused on the Chinese SP and other unidentified objects being shot down over the United States and Canada.

I point this out because out of the many potential threats to the United States, many feel that North Korea is not a particularly urgent or immediate problem to address. How would you describe the threat from North Korea and should Americans be paying more attention to it? 

David Maxwell: Yeah, that's a great question.

I think it's only logical that we would focus on the balloon. Uh, so much. You know, I, I look at North Korea as the fourth of the five major threats that our national security outlines. You know, the pacing item of course is China, Putin's war in Russia, I mean in Ukraine. And then of course Iran is uh, you know, poses a big threat in the Middle East.

You know, then I think we look at, at North Korea really as the fourth, and then the [00:39:00] ongoing threat of violent extremist organizations. So when you look at all of those, we tend to compartmentalize North Korea as a little different. It is isolated. It is in this little peninsula, which. Is, you know, unusual in that North Korea is connected to all the other threats and I think we overlook that.

North Korea, of course, is a threat to South Korea, a threat to Japan, and as we saw in the parade last week, has developed an I C B M capability and perhaps most troubling, some analysts suspect that they showed off a, uh, solid fuel rocket for an I C B M, which will complicate our defensive capabilities and our indications and the warning to the launch of an I C B M.

So it can threaten, it does threaten the United States, but it's other activities are really. Troubling as well. Of course, China and North Korea have the only alliance both those countries have, so they, they work in a cooperative manner, although not lockstep. [00:40:00] Kim Jong-un has shown, uh, support for Putin in his war in Ukraine to include today in the Wall Street Journal report from C S I S showing imagery of trains traveling to Russia, purportedly carrying am.

To support, uh, the Russians in Ukraine. But beyond those physical and geographic relationships, we see North Korea conducting cyber activities around the world, whether it's the bitcoin markets, whether it's fishing, hacking, attack, holding, health facilities, hostage, you know, with malware and all kinds of attempts to, to steal money to support the regime.

And then we have its other activities, which include drug trafficking, meth, methamphetamines, counterfeiting of drugs. Uh, Q include Viagra, counterfeiting of cigarettes, money laundering, overseas slave labor, and one of the worst is counterfeiting a hundred dollars bills. I mean, we have changed our a hundred dollars [00:41:00] bills because of the capabilities of North Korea to counterfeit.

In fact, I heard. Treasury department official, jokingly say, but with some, some truth that the way they can tell a counterfeit North Korean bill is that it's actually better than an American produced bill . And so it just is an indication of their capabilities to, uh, to counterfeit. So all of these things, North Korea is connected to, of course, missile proliferation to Iran, nuclear proliferation to Syria.

Thankfully the Israelis destroyed the nuclear plant in 2007 that was being constructed in Syria. And then of course proliferation of all kinds of weapons and training to conflict zones, primarily in Africa and the Middle East. Yemen, the Scuds, I think that Iran provides to Yemen come from North Korea, that they fire into Saudi Arabia.

So I say all that because North Korea is connected to so much and so many of our other national security interests around the world. , 

Anita Kellogg: you make so many great points there that I want to follow up on, [00:42:00] but I, I really appreciate the way that you talk about the interconnection of North Korea and many of the ongoing conflicts, because I think that doesn't get talked about or enough focus on the activities other than its nuclear program.

So I first visited the North Korean border in 1999, and it feels like little has changed over that time period except for the gradual and incremental progress of North Korea's nuclear program. Negotiating directly with North Korean leaders hasn't worked to halt or denuclearize North Korea's weapons program multilateralism, such as the six party talks under George W.

Bush hasn't worked. Neither economic incentives nor sanctions have altered the status. Both ignoring North Korea and giving it global attention have produced the same results. It feels like an intractable problem. Before I ask you about what the US can should be doing about it, I want to talk about the end goals for [00:43:00] strategy on North Korea.

Is de equalization realistic? Are there more achievable goals the US should be focusing 

David Maxwell: on? Great question. You know, what is our instate or as, uh, Lieutenant General Jim Dubak would say, what is the acceptable, durable political arrangement that will serve, protect, and advance our interests in Northeast Asia?

I agree wholeheartedly. Kim Jon is not going to give up nuclear weapons. They are critical to every aspect of his rule and, uh, survival of the regime. He has no intention of it, and there is no way that we will be able to negotiate and use. There are no carrots and there are no sticks that will cause him to give up his nuclear weapons.

So I think that's a realization that I think many people are coming to. But denuclearization, of course, is a worthy goal. You know, we don't want the peninsula be nuclearized. And in fact, north and South Korea in 1992 signed the agreement on denuclearization, and that's where the term has come from in the Korean context, [00:44:00] that agreement.

And they agreed to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. And of course, people forget that the US had nuclear weapons in Korea, and in support of that agreement, the US removed them. So there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea, despite what North Korean rhetoric says. And then of course, you also ask, are there other things that we can pursue?

We are, I think, trying to pursue a, an element of, uh, containment, trying to contain North Korea's capabilities. Its growth, and of course it's its ability to attack South Korea. And, and so I think that is ongoing, and that's, that's really part of managing the problem and preventing things from getting worse.

But as you. Correctly noted they incrementally improve their military capabilities, at least their advanced ones in terms of missile and nuclear capabilities. And so what can we really seek to achieve? Well, recently, uh, ambassador Robert Joseph led a, a working group, which I was part of. And we've published a [00:45:00] new proposal, a strategy that we should really focus on.

And it is on the realization that Kim Jong is, is not going to give up his nuclear weapons. And what we really need, and the conventional wisdom is denuclearization. And then unification. And I mentioned unification because every president sends Amen. Bach. And, and Barack Obama have said peaceful unification is the goal.

And uh, Obama and Iman Bach, president Park and President Obama, president Trump and President. Said that South Korea will take the lead in achieving peaceful unification. And so all the presidents since 2009 have said unification is the key. But we have always thought of denuclearization first, unification later.

What we really need to focus on is, is reversing that conventional wisdom and realize that we are not going to achieve denuclearization nor an end to the crimes against humanity and the horrendous human rights [00:46:00] abuses that are taking place in the north until there is unification for three in unified Korea.

One that is secure, stable, economically vibrant, non-nuclear, and governed by a liberal constitutional form of government based on freedom, liberty, free market, economy, and human rights. And so that's really the acceptable, durable political arrangement that is going to bring about the conditions for peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

Of course, There's a lot to talk about how to get there. That's a, a big part of the, the problem. But our new strategy proposes that as really the, the end state. And it also proposes that we need to take a human rights upfront approach and we need to have a sophisticated information and influence campaign against the north focusing on the multiple target audiences from the regime, the elite military leadership, the second tier leadership, those military leaders outside of the core that have [00:47:00] power, significant power and often control elements of, of weapons, of mass destruction.

And then of course the general population, the Korean people who live in the north. And of course, we have been reluctant to wage an information campaign. And in fact, because of Kim Jong's actions and his sister Kim Yo Jung, in 2021, they coerced South Korea into banning information operations. You know, the so-called nonlethal law was passed to stop.

South Korea from sending balloons into North Korea, particularly from the Escapees who have been doing that for years. And this is because something that we, we tend to overlook. But Dr. Jung Pac, who is the deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia Pacific and the deputy to son Kim, who is ambassador son Kim, who is the US special representative for North Korea.

She often asked this question, who does Kim Jon fear the most, the US military or the Korean people living in the north? And the answer is, the [00:48:00] Korean people living in the north, especially when armed with information, information is an existential threat to Kim Jong Nu. And so that is why in June of 2021, Kim Jong threatened to blow up the South Korean liaison building inside North Korea in the Keong industrial complex. She threatened and then she ordered it to be executed and they blew it up. And six months later, South Korea passed the anti leaflet law coerced by North Korea into appeasing their demand to stop information flow.

So this is a real indication of what the threat is to Kim Jon and how important information is for the Korean people in, in the North. And so we really look, instead of focusing on denuclearization as the goal, we really need to focus on unification. And of course, people will rightly say, well, a Korean unified Korean means there's no more Kim Jong-un.

And yes, that's correct, Kim Jong is [00:49:00] the root of all evil. The regime is the root of all evil on the Korean peninsula, and that is what is holding up any long-term peace that is really necessary for the Korean peninsula. 

Anita Kellogg: That has, so that's such a fascinating answer and I have so many questions about it.

But before I want to go to your earlier point and talk a little bit about what the US is doing. So last month, south Korean President Yun mentioned in an offhanded sort of way, the possibility that South Korea could get its own nuclear arms if the security situation with North Korea worsens. No one truly foresees that possibility.

But it was taken to be signaled to the Biden administration that soul is not satisfied with how the US is dealing with the North Korean threat. What's the current state of affairs regarding US actions on North Korea? What is the Biden administration doing to address this challenge And what more can be done to alleviate South Korea's fears?

David Maxwell: Well, there's a lot to that. To [00:50:00] give you the short answers. Next week will be the first tabletop exercise that will be conducted between South Korea and the United States on response to North Korea nuclear weapons. Of course, we've reactivated the extended deterrence working group. Going back to the security council meetings that took place in December.

What people both in South Korea and the United States seem to overlook or not remember or misremember maybe is. Last year, South Korea, I mean, North Korea conducted more missile tests than ever before, more than 70 missile launches. And during that time, the United States multiple occasions deployed strategic assets to the region, carrier battle groups who even re redeploy the carrier battle group, but many strategic assets to the region, to Guam, Japan, and to South Korea.

We have reinvigorated our exercise program, you know, coming off of the decision in 2018 to cancel, postpone and scale back exercises because the previous president said they [00:51:00] were too expensive and, and worthless and, and wanted to. Support diplomacy, thinking that appeasing Kim Jong with stopping exercises would come to agreement.

And then of course, covid struck. So readiness declined in the combined military force. But this past year we have reinvigorated the exercise program and really built it up. And although we conduct exercises all year long, we are now forecasting exercises. Over the next six months, we'll conduct more than 20 combined exercises.

And we are forecasting that to show that readiness, sustained readiness is the normal condition that we are not reacting to North Korea's actions. We are sustaining readiness at all times. And so what is really important is that President Union and President Biden have laid the foundation for deterrence and defense.

High level of, of readiness of our combined military force is essential for any other actions that we take. So that's one area that we, uh, dealing with this situation. Now, South Korea and other [00:52:00] countries, other allies look at US actions and have become concerned whether it is the withdrawal from Afghanistan are slow, start with supporting Ukraine.

They question our commitment. Now, those two examples are apples and oranges from our commitment in Korea. But you know, the fact is people interpret those activities in their own interest and so people get concerned. We should never forget that we are fully committed to South Korea and 28,500 troops on the peninsula is a blood commitment to the defense.

But again, we're also a victim of our success for deterring war for 70 years, and those 28,500 troops are just part of the landscape now and South Korea and often overlooked as the real commitment. And so that does cause some problems, you know, and leads to these, these decisions. Now the other thing is that President Y is rightly concerned and committed to the defense of South Korea.

And so he is looking at the threat to the, from the north, and he wants to do [00:53:00] everything he can. And so I think that his, his call for South Korea developing nuclear weapons is a response to the surveys of where 70%, 76%, I think in, in the last survey of South Koreans say they should have their own or at least consider their own nuclear weapons.

Mm-hmm. . I think President Moon though, is acting shrewdly. They want us nuclear weapons back on the peninsula as a deterrent. And so my guess in the recent report that Victor Cha at the Center for Strategic International Studies just, uh, published, said, although their report was predecisional, which I thought was interesting from a, a think tank, and that is not a government, uh, think tank, but it said that, you know, we should consider re stationing US nuclear weapons in.

That's Predecisional. And I think what might be in the offing is that in return for South Korea not developing nuclear weapons, that we eventually agree to putting nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, which is [00:54:00] problematic in, its in its own right. And, uh, they're not only going to need to have tabletop exercises for responding to North Korean nuclear, uh, threat, they're also going to have to have tabletop exercises dealing with the protests that will take place in South Korea.

When we had nuclear weapons in South Korea, we had some 90 installations. So who knows where those nuclear weapons were. There's only about six right now, and really only about two places where you could locate at them. And so the current protests that take place 24 7 in Sanju, where the, uh, Thad Battery is located, those will take place on a much greater scale by anti-nuclear anti-US and agitators from the north.

So there will be protests that will, will take place on a significant level and will need to be prepared for that. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, there's so much there. One thing I was thinking as you were talking was that if nuclear weapons were to return to the Korean Peninsula, to South Korea, it's not just South Korean protests, that would [00:55:00] be a major issue, I think, but also China.

How do you think China would react? And then there's this whole, you know, problem of the intensity of tensions between the US and China. China's like plays a huge role in being able to address the North Korean problem, and can we really adequately do much about it if we cannot get China on board with any of our plans?

David Maxwell: I think first, you know, the bottom line is we cannot expect China to solve the security issues of South Korea and the United States. I think that's, we should understand that. I think you are very correct. China will protest in such a way, primarily against South Korea. that they did with that issue.

Mm-hmm. , uh, they will conduct aggressive economic warfare. If we put nuclear weapons on it, they will try to punish South Korea. So we need to be prepared for that, but we are going to have to have an economic response and hopefully quad and, you know, AUS and the other Asian [00:56:00] countries that we can overcome the damage that, that China will try to inflict on South Korea.

You know, 25% of South Korean trade is with China. Mm-hmm. , another 25% is with the four quad countries, and then the other 50% is with, uh, the rest of the world. So we are going to have to have to be able to deal with that loss of, of the 25% for South Korea. So I think that's likely, China will certainly protest and, and be very upset and, and they will blame South Korea, I think, and, uh, and indirectly of course the United States, but China is not going to, you know, first of all, I think it's a myth to think that China controls North Korea.

they are, you know, the, the alliance that is supposedly closer than lips and teeth, their alliance goes back to 1963. Mm-hmm. , but of course, Chinese people's volunteers, you know, saved North Korea for Kim Ung. But I think the other thing is that all three Kims, particularly Kim Ung and Kim, Jon Kim to a certain extent, have effectively played the [00:57:00] superpowers against each other.

Kim Ung manipulated Mao Stalin to be able to attack South Korea. And so I think we have to think about North Korea in that vein, they are not really aligned with anybody. They're not beholden to anybody. Their Juche ideology really emphasizes their independence and strength being able to stand up to anyone to include China and Russia if, if need be.

And so China cannot really control North Korea. Now, it could, because China, over the years, I, I look at it as a barometer. As international aid goes up, Chinese aid declines as international aid goes down, Chinese aid. , you know, increases because I think what China wants, and we've heard this articulated as the three nos.

Mm-hmm. , they want no war on the Korean peninsula, no instability in regime collapse and no nuclear weapons. Well, they're bating 600, they're a pretty good baseball team. They got two out of three so far. But nuclear weapons to China I do not think are viewed in the same way as we view the nuclear threat.[00:58:00] 

You know, I've heard from Chinese, uh, scholars that they don't believe that North Korea would use nuclear weapons on China. You know, that it's not a threat to them, although, you know, they do express concern with loose nukes and, and the like, uh, but it's not the same kind of threat. So they don't have the incentive to solve that problem.

They want to have no war and they want to have no instability and collapse, but they can live with the nuclear weapons and now they could coerce North Korea and they could cut off aid and support for North Korea, but that could lead to instability and collapse. On the other hand, we've just seen since 2020 and Covid the closing of trade.

Both legal, trade and illicit activities between North Korea and China and North Korea continues to muddle through. So North Korea is able to, to absorb tremendous amount of hardship and, you know, terrible conditions and still continue to muddle through and, and survive. So I don't know if even fully [00:59:00] cutting off all of Chinese support would really affect the regime's decision making.

And I also look at, uh, use this analogy to, to describe the relationship. North Korea is like a drowning child. It's got a failed economy, you know, it's in a, a tough neighborhood, it's never going to be able to recover using its current system. And China is like a lifeguard with a life run and it tosses that life ring and allows it to keep its head above.

but it refuses to reel it into safety. And I think that's really the way the situation is because they want to keep North Korea as that buffer. They want to keep us and Democratic forces off of its border. Uh, it wants to maintain the status quo for as long as possible. And there is some irony that all of our interests are aligned.

None of us want more , you know, I mean, that. You know, when you really think about it, okay, let's all prevent war. That's good. Now we all have different ways that we go about, uh, doing that, but you know, that we're, we're not in agreement, but we don't want war. The other thing too is regime collapse, [01:00:00] which I could talk to in detail here, but, you know, instability and collapse is going to be catastrophic, and it's unlikely to occur without some level of conflict.

And, and so it's not going to be a benign event like East and West Germany. People who wish for collapse, you know, could be mistaken. Back in the nineties, we were really concerned with it during arduous March, the famine of 94 to 96. And you know, we, when we worried about it very much, we wrote a plan for 29 to try to deal with it.

But they didn't collapse. And they didn't collapse because the election of Kim de Jung, the Sunshine policy transferred billions of dollars to the regime. and it also didn't collapse because of the growth of markets. When the public distribution system failed, markets evolved to this day. There's some 400 markets in the north and primarily run by women.

Women really became the breadwinners and those keeping their families together. And so that is really what has been resilient for North Korea for the last two decades. The problem now is that with Covid, Kim Jong-un [01:01:00] has really cracked down on all aspects of society to include markets placing great restrictions on them, trying to police up all the foreign currency, which most of the market activity is, is done in dollars in r and b.

And they, they're cracking down in information, you know, communications on movement, and of course they closed the border with China to trade. So now there is really no safety. No way out for the people. And so the potential for instability, I think now is greater than it was in the 1990s and combined with the fact that now North Korea has nuclear weapons, instability and collapse could be very, very dangerous.

You know, and we're seeing, we just saw reports, they've reduced the food ration, you know, from 640 grams down to 500 grams to include in the military. And some of the winter training cycle was canceled because some of the units could not feed their, their troops sufficiently, but yet they'll spend a month preparing for a parade on February.

Mm-hmm. as they did, you know, they're really, the regime [01:02:00] is, is just, I mean, bankrupt in more than one way, and it's really a terrible situation up there. But I'll stop 

Anita Kellogg: there. Also, I want to follow up on that, and I know your will of that. Typically, when regimes are overthrown, they're more usually replaced by dictators or prolonged internal violence, which is what you've been speaking about.

can this be prevented in North Korea or should we just suspect a period of instability? 

David Maxwell: Well, yes, we must plan for it. I think it, we have to because the nature of the system is such that, you know, from Kim's time, they have built the system that is about keeping the regime in power, keeping one person in power.

And so the Song Boone System, which is the social classification system, 51 classes of society that are divided basically into the elite, the wavering middle class, not economic middle class, but the middle classes and then the disloyal [01:03:00] classes at the bottom. And so, This social classification system is really designed to prevent any kind of collective action, any kind of conspiracy, and the security services are such that you know, the party's security services are such that you cannot.

Speak to in any way to anyone about the regime. You know, they have, as a typical communist country, they have their weekly confession sessions. Every, every week that, you know, the, the local populists will meet and confess to the Inman bomb, the local political leaders, which of course they use for their rule bylaw.

You know, that when they want to incarcerate somebody, they take their pre-con confessions that they've given at their weekly sessions. But this is all designed to prevent any kind of conspiracy or collective action. And because, you know, if you and I were having this conversation when we're done, we would report what the other one had said, both to protect ourselves and to get, you know, credit.

We're doing that, and that's something that is really, [01:04:00] really difficult for us to understand. But it is designed to prevent any kind of overthrow. So what that means is there is unlikely to be a success. And of course in their party documents, in their constitution, there is no succession mechanism. It is dynastic and events that have taken place have been orchestrated by the regime pre-planned, but there's no documentation, no authority directing that.

It's only the leader that does that and, and so we're not likely to see, and if of course, the question I always ask the national security officials is what have we learned today that Kim Jong was. What actions would we take? Because if with no succession mechanism, and if they have not and they have not done that, um, you know, it's unlikely that it will be stable for very long.

You know, the process is when the leader dies, they lock down the country, prevent all movement. They recall all party officials to a certain level to Pyongyang. They have the meeting to choose the new leader. Well, the new leader is always [01:05:00] preordained or has been. If that hasn't been done, then there's no process for reconciling that.

And that's where we're going to see conflict, you know, from within Pyongyang. And then if there's the inability to manage the military and security services, we could see people start to fend for themselves. And those core commanders throughout may become defacto warlords using their military power to survive.

And so, Conflict is very likely to occur, and there's all d different ways of that things could, could evolve, you know, that conflict could arise among the military first if the regime is unable to. , uh, provide resources to all the military. If they start cutting off military units from supply, from resources, then those military units may take action on their own to continue to survive.

And so when that happens, we really are, are on the path to regime collapse. And just to put things in perspective for those who think about this, [01:06:00] Bob Collins, Robert Collins, who's a longtime strategist in Korea, retired now when we were working on 50 29, he really described, uh, the seven phases of collapse, which he articulated based on long study of, of regime collapses around the world.

But we came up with a definition to really describe collapse specifically to North Korea. And that is when the party loses central governing effectiveness, the ability to govern the, the entire North Territory from Pyongyang, combined with the lack, the loss of coherence and support of the military. Those two conditions when they happen, that's when Kim Jong-un and the regime will no longer be able to govern.

And what happens after that is potentially very chaotic and internal infighting, chaos, civil war, but the loss of central governing effectiveness and the coherence and support in the military, that is what is going to bring about regime collapse. The problem with that is, is when those conditions are emerging, [01:07:00] and Kim Jon de observes them, he may determine that his only option is to execute his campaign plan to unify the peninsula under his rule, in order to ensure survival.

Now, many people say that he survived of the regime is the, is the goal. You know, so why don't we just buy him off and send him to a villa in China? He doesn't want that kind of survival. He wants to survive as the leader, as the, the, the head of, of North Korea, and ultimately the leader of a unified Korea under his control.

Anita Kellogg: I mean, I think that's a realistic but pretty scary scenario. I'd be interested to hear what the National Security officials tell you about that. Every 

David Maxwell: answer is, well, we'll wait and see, which is what we've done. We'll see how conditions develop. And my response to that is perhaps we should be ready to reach out.

Perhaps we should end. And ultimately what we really want to do is observe for emerging leaders. And our information and influence program really needs to focus on a [01:08:00] couple things, many things, but one of them is for the military leaders. If you don't attack the South, then you'll have a place in the unified Korea.

that's one important point there. But for emerging leaders, whoever might emerge, they should know that the South and the US are willing to talk, provide support, and negotiate for the safety of the emerging leader and the entire country of the North. And so our information program needs to be focused on that rather than what is normally done now by the Escapees, which is a lot of insulting of the regime, a lot of, you know, telling how bad they are, which, you know, that's all true.

But we really need to focus on information that is articulating policy and articulating the future. What does the unified Korea going to look like? What does land ownership look like? You know, how mm-hmm , are you going to be integrated into the economic and political system of a unified Korea? All those things are really important and we should be focused on that kind of influence and information [01:09:00] going into North Korea.

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, I think you make really important points and I, I really. Think of that, particularly when you talk about the information influence campaign being a lot more than just saying, oh, north Korean dictatorship is bad. West has freedom, and things of that nature. But I think it's really important to prepare for that chaos and to, to make sure that any potential successors in that sort of contested arena would, would know that they could have these policy options.

Although it seems to me there would be other penalties maybe for them if they're seeing working too closely with the US and South Korea. I find your idea, and that along with your working group that you are part of about the goal should be instead of denuclearization, which is not going to happen under the Kim regime, a free and unified [01:10:00] Korea.

But my sense is that reunification seems just as difficult for several reasons. Leaving aside overthrowing the Kim regime, there is the overwhelming cost of reunification. Who pays for that? It's clear that South Korea alone would be unable to foot the bill. Then there's the South Korean people themselves who are not enthusiastic about the idea of reunification.

And finally, there's China, which would probably do anything they can maybe even more to stop the US from having troops on their border. How do you think these challenges can be overcome? 

David Maxwell: Great question. Lemme take the last one first. China, although it wants to maintain the status quo, I think has accepted the fact that unification comes.

It will be a free and unified Korea under the Republic of Korea, so it'll be a United Republic of Korea. You are okay, Iraq. That will be the future. I think China accepts that, and I say that because one is that China is already. [01:11:00] Making plans to exert influence over the Peninsula economic influence. They are ma, they are taking out 50 and 100 year leases of mineral rights throughout North Korea.

And my belief is they're doing that so that when unification occurs, they'll be able to say to the Koreans that we've made these agreements and we want them. We made them with Koreans and your constitution, South Korea, which now is the dominant one, says that all of Korea is sovereign Republic of Korea territory, and all Koreans are citizens of the Republic of Korea.

And so they will argue that we made agreements with your citizens and we want them honored. That's one. Second is I think that, uh, China's real long-term goal is, is along the lines of what you said. They want us forces off the peninsula, off the Asian land mass. That is their goal, and so I think they're going to posture to do that.

Now, I don't think that they, I, I, I believe that [01:12:00] they don't want war to make that happen, but I, I think they want to do that. The irony is though, the irony is that who will demand us forces off the peninsula? Most of all, it'll probably be the American people. You know, when there's a unified Korea, they'll say, why do we need them there?

And the demands to bring home troops will be come from the United States. You know, there are some, I've heard some pundits in the US say, we should tell China when there's unification, we'll go home. I don't believe we should say that. I believe that South Korea and the United States should say.

President, the future presence of US troops will depend on the security situation in the reach. And so if the security situation warrants, we won't need troops there. But if it does, then we're prepared to sustain the alliance. And so I, what I would like to do is to present that to the Chinese, you know, here are the options and maybe that will moderate their behavior.

But I don't believe China wants to absorb North Korea. I don't believe, I mean, they would be an occupier, which goes against, [01:13:00] and they just would not want that. Mm-hmm. , uh, that headache, uh, because there's no love between the Chinese people and the Korean people, uh, the North Korean people. And so I think we should, we should stand that so that I think China, Not support unification, but there will be acquisition acquiescence to it if it believes it can achieve its long-term objective.

Uh, getting US forces off the peninsula now to South Korea. Yes. Expensive. I think, you know, south Koreans have had probably done more PhD dissertations on east and West German unification than any other. There's certainly concerned with that and we look at the huge disparity between North and South, and I think people make assumptions that.

We will see the immediate attempt to increase the GD or the, uh, the personal income of people to make it equitable between North and South. And you know, that's not going to happen right away. You're not going to give $40,000 to each Korean family in the north, the per capita income. You're not going to equalize that right [01:14:00] away.

And so there are going to be tremendous costs, but they need to be planned for. And I think there are ways to do to mitigate the cost and really come out on the other side as former President Pae, the Impeach President PAE used to say unification as a bonanza. You know, when there are, are, uh, uh, 85 million Koreans with the industry of the South, the resources of the North, when it finally gets going, it's going to be an economic powerhouse and it, it will really be a dominant country in the region and, and throughout Asia and the world.

But we got to get there. And so all the fears that you articulate now, the Koreans in the south, yes. There is not a, a strong desire for unification. , but you also can't prevent it either. Who is going to prevent it? I talked about the Chinese. I don't think anybody's going to intervene with force, whether it's Japan, who may not want unification, Russia, China, but also the Korean people in the South.

If North Korea collapses or if there's war and North Korea is defeated, there is only one path and one [01:15:00] outcome, and that's unification. You cannot leave the 25 million Koreans in the North suffering on their own after their country is devastated either through collapse or war. Now, the good news is that South Korea has a ministry of unification, and I just happen to spend a week right before Christmas in Korea with the Ministry of Unification, and they are embarked on revitalizing their unification plans.

In fact, they're going to release their new plans. It'll be onward toward unification, unification on abbreviated U N I O N Uni on or union, you know? And, uh, so they're, they're already preparing for that. And so the Korean people, yes, they don't want unification, but they may have no, and I didn't say they don't want unification.

Most Koreans want unification. You ask somebody in their heart of hearts, they want them, but if you're asked your question, do you want to pay for unification? The answer is hell no. You know, that's, that's really, they don't want to interrupt, you know, the good life that they have. And, you know, [01:16:00] people believe there are stark differences between north and south.

Although I would argue that the koreanness, the spirit of the Han, the innate feeling of being Korean exists on both sides of the DMZ. And it's more aligned than people think. And I'll just give this quick anecdote. When Koreans suffer, They survive. But when given opportunities, they thrive. And we've really seen this, you know, the hardship of the north for the last seven decades.

The people still survive. And in fact, when given the opportunities, we see how they have developed markets, they have the capability to be entrepreneurial. Just as the South Korean, Korean society had no democratic background, had no free market background, but after the war, the ashes of the Korean War, given the opportunity with security and you know, and over time they developed the miracle on the Han, the 10th largest economy in the world, the only nation to go from a major aid recipient to a major donation only O E C D nation to do that.[01:17:00] 

soft power, K-pop, you know, major ship building, major nuclear power. I mean, South Korea is a major nuclear power, peaceful nuclear power, but you know, 24 nuclear power plants and they export nuclear power around the world. So all these things happened in North and South Korea. But underlying this is the spirit of Korea, the oneness, the spirit of the Han that exists on both sides.

And so unification will be hard, but the ministry of unification is really embarking on planning for it, which is necessary. And I think that there's really no other alternative. Again, we're not going to, nobody's going to stand for a divided country with a wealthy and healthy South Korea in a starving population that will end up worse than Somalia, even, you know, with no functioning government and just continued civil war inside.

I don't think anybody will stand for that. And so I think there, you know, South Korea will have to lead the intervention to bring peace and security and ultimately [01:18:00] prosperity to the Korean Peninsula. And that's why unification is so important. It's just 

Anita Kellogg: a, a couple things that I. Push back just a little bit on the economic challenges would be more come from, as it was in West Germany, from the influx of North Koreans who would prefer to live in South Korea.

And suddenly you have this influx, even if they were to stay in North Korea of cheap labor. So a lot of jobs to moving from South Korea to North Korea. So it seems like there would be a lot of economic disruption that, that South Koreans really don't want to pay for. So two questions related to that is, is it really inevitable that South Korea would see the overthrow of Kim and choose to not let it things play out in North Korea because of how South Koreans, the people themselves would react?

And kind of following up on that, Should the [01:19:00] world, should at least the West, should the United States be coordinating closely in the reunification plan, is there, will you think in the West to create some sort of new economic pact that would help pay for these, for these costs That no doubt would be incurred.

David Maxwell: Yeah, so your first question, particularly about refugees, people coming south, I think people, certainly China fears that, uh, refugees from the north going into China and, you know, we've seen them reinforce their border military and the like. You know, obviously South Korea is, you know, now the, the promised land for many in the north, you know, the economic, uh, biology.

However, we also have to look at human nature and 33,000 escapees in South Korea. Many, if not, most of them want to go back to the north, not to go back to the regime, but to go back to their homes and people are attached to their homes. And so one of the important policies that South Korea must have in terms of unification is that when the unification [01:20:00] process begins, people are going to have title to their land.

They're going to own their land, they're going to own their apartments, and that is going to contribute to a stay put policy and help reduce the amount of refugee flow. Now of course, there will be people that will want to come be attracted to that, however, Many people will want to stay there. And so as part of the Information Influence program, people need to understand what owning land is all about.

What title to the land is, because now the regime owns everything, the party. And so they don't have that concept of land ownership, so they need to be educated on that. You know, one of the things that I long proposed, they need to create the dramas in South Korea. The entertainment shows that show what unification is going to be like, and they need to build programs, entertainment program.

Showing the future so they can teach people about land ownership. You know, I'm sure you probably saw Crash Landing on you, the Netflix drama that took place. Koreans from the North who I've talked to, very moved by that. [01:21:00] And one of the things that that really moved the soldiers that I talked to was the fact that they didn't portray the Koreans in the north as monsters.

Even the military, which of course upset conservatives in the South, but they were impressed by that. And these dramas have influence in the North. And so, We need to teach people about land ownership. That's one of the ways to reduce the amount of refugees. And so, but there will be refugees, particularly to the South, and so South Korea has to prepare for that.

Now, in terms of international economic contributions, yes, I think that what the unification Ministry has to do, working with its ministry of Finance and commerce and is to determine how investment opportunities are going to be managed in the north. Of course, you have the tables in the south, tremendous amount of resources, but also, , you know, there will be problems if they dominate everything as well.

And so the South Korean government is going to have to have to manage how investment is going to occur. And we certainly want to encourage inter or South [01:22:00] Korea should want to encourage international investment to include from Japan, which of course has a whole another complication because of historical.

Mm-hmm. friction, but resources. But this is why South Korea though, has to have the comprehensive plans and the effort must be led by South Korea. The military effort and the political effort. And the economic effort. They must share those plans so people can understand them and see how they can benefit from them.

You know, what kind of investment opportunities exist. And South Korea has to encourage that and, and create an environment, an investment environment where people will come in and of course, you know, gainfully employ. Koreans from the north in those economic efforts. You got to be very careful to prevent the carpet bagger, uh, situation after the US Civil War where Northerners went in the south to take advantage of, of the south.

You know, that's got to be prevented by the South Korean government. But all that can be done with good planning ahead of time, [01:23:00] transparent plans, and those plans can also generate confidence among the Korean people in the South and the international community, that there is a sound plan that will reduce the problems.

There's no plan that's going to eliminate, it's going to be a mess, it's going to be a challenge. There will be continued suffering. It will be expensive, but good planning can mitigate all of that to a manageable level. Of course, no suffering or any suffering is, is not acceptable, but you know, we have to face facts that there will be continued suffering for some time to come because this is a really, really complicated situation.

Anita Kellogg: Well, thank you. This has been such a fascinating discussion and I really like your new way of framing what the end goal should be. I think your take on informational warfare and influence is really intriguing, and that document from that working group with the six recommendations, I believe will definitely be in our show notes.

So, great. Thank you so [01:24:00] much. 

David Maxwell: Thank you. I really appreciate the opportunity and uh, you know, what we started out talking about, I think Korea is really important to the United States and really to the world. And while we hope that we hope and pray, there's never war, we do have to be ready for it. And Korea does affect, affect geo strategic thinking throughout the world.

So we, we can't let it, you know, hide behind the moniker of the hermit kingdom. We've got to be prepared for dealing with, with what might really. 

Anita Kellogg: I just cannot agree more and it really echoes my own sentiments that I feel about Korea and what attention or attention it's, it's not getting. So thank you. It was such a comprehensive overview.

You know, you have a lot of interesting and new thoughts about it, and so I really, really appreciate it. Thank you. So I hope you enjoyed listening to the interview, and that brings us to the end of this episode of Kellogg's Global Politics. You can visit our website at www.kelloggsglobalpolitics.com and follow us on Twitter [01:25:00] at Global Kellogg or me @arkellogg.

Ryan Kellogg: You can also reach us by email, so anita@kelloggsglobalpolitics.com and myself, ryan@kelloggsglobalpolitics.com. And as always, please see the show notes for all the articles that we discussed in episode. And if you like the show, please take the time to tell your friends cheered on your social sites.

It's a simple, quick, and free way to support the show. Thanks everyone. Thanks. Bye.