Kellogg's Global Politics

The Transatlantic Relationship with Daniel Hamilton

• Anita Kellogg • Episode 36

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On this episode, Anita speaks with Daniel Hamilton, a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University SAIS. He is also the President of the Transatlantic Leadership Network and a former senior State Department official. We discuss the ups and downs of the Transatlantic Alliance and how the war in Ukraine and strategic competition with China affect the US’s relationship with Europe.

There have been several substantial developments in the Ukraine-Russia war. First, we discuss the Wagner rebellion and their march to Moscow, which was halted by a deal between Wagner leader Yevgeny Proghozin and Belarus’s President Alexander Lukashenko. Then, we catch up on the latest in Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russia. 


China is also in the news, with Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s trip to the country, and we talk about what the US hopes to achieve with these talks. Finally, we discuss China’s announcement on limiting exports of metals critical to the manufacturing of semiconductor chips.

Topics Discussed in this Episode

  • 06:00 - Russia-Ukraine: Wagner Mutiny, Ukraine’s Counteroffensive, and Cluster Munitions
  • 34:00 - China Strikes Back: Export limits on semiconductor inputs
  • 48:00 - Interview with Daniel Hamilton on US-European relations around Ukraine War and China



Articles and Resources Mentioned in Episode


Russia-Ukraine: Wagner Mutiny, Ukraine’s Counteroffensive, and Cluster Munitions


China Strikes Back: Export limits on semiconductor inputs


Interview with Daniel Hamilton on US-European relations around Ukraine War and China

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Anita Kellogg: [00:00:00] Welcome to Kellogg's Global Politics, a podcast on current events in US foreign Policy and international affairs. My name is Dr. Anita Kellogg, an international relations scholar specializing in the relationship between economics and national security. I'm here with my co-host, Ryan Kellogg, an expert in energy investment and policy.

Ryan Kellogg: I'm glad to be here. This is episode 36 and we're recording this on July 8th, 2023. 

Anita Kellogg: On this episode, I speak with Daniel Hamilton, a non-resident senior [00:00:30] fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of John Hopkins seis. He's also the president of the Transatlantic Leadership Network and a former Senior State Department official.

We discuss the ups and downs of the Transatlantic Alliance and how the war in Ukraine and strategic competition with China affects the US' relationship with Europe. There have been several substantial developments in the Ukraine. Russia war. First would discuss the Wagner rebellion and their march to Moscow, which was [00:01:00] halted by a deal between Wagner leader if Guinea pian and Belarus's President Alexander Lukachenko.

Then we catch up on the latest in Ukraine's Counteroffensive against Russia. China's also in the news with the Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen's trip to the country. We talk about what the US is hoping to achieve with these talks. Finally, we discuss China's announcements on limiting exports of metals critical to the manufacturing of semiconductor chips.

Ryan Kellogg: So it's been a little while since we last [00:01:30] recorded. That's just cuz we've been busy with a couple things. Mostly family. Yeah, mostly family. Had a little trip to to North Carolina to visit my parents and then we had a visitor one of our daughter's friends from la. And which we engaged in a lot of activities.

I think 10 and 11 year olds would, would like in terms of not so much visiting museums, which you think somebody from out of town, you think about DC think the [00:02:00] museums and the monuments. But instead, I think most of their time was at amusement parks and trampolines and bowling, things like that.

But, , I think it was still, it was still a lot of fun for, for them. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. As parents, that's what you Great. Is fun for your children. Right. Unnecessarily yourself. But we had a kind of traditional 4th of July in the city where we went to a parade and saw the fireworks on the Capitol Mall. 

Ryan Kellogg: [00:02:30] Yeah. Yeah.

So that was, that was pretty cool. I had never been here, even though I grew up in North Carolina, I did not go to July 4th. In Washington DC I know you had been when you were little, but that wasn't the greatest of experiences sick with you being sick.

Anita Kellogg: I was sick, yeah. And it was raining and we saw none of the fireworks.

Right. We were standing in front of the White House, which I do not recommend to see the fireworks from. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. Yeah. And I, I think I understand that better now. Cuz before I didn't understand and hell, [00:03:00] heck, I didn't understand till like an hour before where the fireworks are being launched. Sitting, 

sitting up.

Anita Kellogg: So we're sitting in front of the Washington Monument and everyone's facing the middle of the mall. And then you can see people at the Lincoln Memorial facing in our direction and in the very middle. Middle. I know, but I was middle confused of the mall.

Ryan Kellogg: To be fair. There were peop, there were a couple individuals that were facing the Washington Monument 

Anita Kellogg: cause they were trying to get, get the sun out of their eyes.

I 

Ryan Kellogg: could see that now. But when you watch on [00:03:30] television, just the way that the camera angle is, it always seems like is shooting fireworks over the Washington Monument. And I'm not convinced that like the inaugural in Trump's big, remember his big firework display that he inappropriately used all the monuments to for his campaign, right.

In 2020. I felt like maybe they were shooting fireworks from a different location. So in my mind it's like, yeah, okay, I get the Lincoln Memorial, but then I also thought they're shooting fireworks around the Washington [00:04:00] Monument. But that didn't make sense cuz there were people seated all around the watched a monument.

Anita Kellogg: They're like, that's what I'm saying. Like how, where would they have shot it from? I don't know. It was a complete crowd. You sure? They're going to allow the crowd to be right where they're shooting the fireworks. So there's this whole blank space in the middle of the mall where nobody knew that and everybody is facing, and I was like, what?

I bet that's where they're going to shoot the fireworks from. Like that's just 

Ryan Kellogg: now on that, that was, that was my fine engineering mind that worked there. [00:04:30] 

Anita Kellogg: I bet it's the place where no people are at.

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. So, but overall, I mean, I, I thought it was a really good firework display. Yeah. It 

Anita Kellogg: was a really neat experience. I feel like in some ways things weren't quite, quite as crowded as I thought they would be. Like the parade wasn't, and then we got there early to the, to the mall and we, we didn't need to be there that early before the [00:05:00] fireworks.

Yeah. Now the exception to that is by the time the fireworks were shooting, the mall was completely covered with people. So leaving was a nightmare. Yeah. That was bad. Was was a total nightmare. Was rough. Especially for someone like me who doesn't like crowds, who Yeah. Has trouble breathing when I'm in a crowd like that.

And it was just a crush to get on the metro was literally being like, People were like pushing themselves. Yeah. No. 

Ryan Kellogg: And we walked a good, I mean, it was a good mile. Yeah. So it wasn't like we took the nearest [00:05:30] metro station. We thought, oh, okay. Well maybe, maybe we will. Some of the crowd will dissipate. But no, it was, it was pretty crowded.

Yeah, it was pretty 

Anita Kellogg: crowded. So I didn't like that part at all. Yeah. But overall, I thought it was, yeah. It was better than I expected. Yeah. It was fun to do 

Ryan Kellogg: at least once. That's right. Might really nice. You did. Yeah. Yeah. I think the 

Anita Kellogg: fireworks probably, yeah. We wouldn't go back to the parade. The parade was 

Ryan Kellogg: underwhelming.

It was a little underwhelming, but it was still cool. And we had a nice spot. Mm-hmm. [00:06:00] That was shady on the grass. Mm-hmm. So, no, no complaints there. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. That was a nice 4th of July. I hope everyone else had a good fourth as well. Yep. All right. To get started. You have some updates on the Russia, Ukraine war.

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. So obviously a lot going on since our last episode about a month ago. But I think we want to lead off with kind of what dominated the headlines a couple weeks ago with the Wagner [00:06:30] Group mutiny. So, so we've talked a lot about the, the Wagner mercenary group, both involvement in the Ukraine war, and then obviously their detrimental activities in the Middle East and Africa.

But what happened on June 25th was a, ended up being an abor aborted mutiny That was really kicked off by a July 1st deadline that the Russian Defense Ministry had set for the [00:07:00] organization, saying that all volunteer formations, so essentially mercenary groups like Wagner, Must sign a contract that would effectively put them under state control.

So this created a, a deadline and a pressure point for the organization. And it's, it is not just the leader Prighozen who's under pressure, although obviously, , he had the most to lose, but the individual soldiers as well. I thought Rand had a nice study detailing some [00:07:30] of the economic incentives as a, as a mercenary group since the beginning of time.

They're motivated by money and, but I didn't know like what was the difference between Wagner military pay and Russian military pay and it's really substantial. So, Russian, the average Wagner soldier receives about $10,000 per month, which is substantial payment for, for Russian and kind of that cost of living versus in a.

Average sold Russian soldier within the [00:08:00] military is about $2,500 per month. So a margin of, of, of four times. So you had this, this pressing deadline. At the same time you had the leader of Wagner you genchi Prighozen who led the mutiny with the apparent stated goal of confronting and potentially kidnapping based on some of the, the information that's come out since the event.

The Russian Defense Minister Sergey SGU, and then the chief of Russian [00:08:30] general staff of Valerie ov. So. This all took place over a couple days. Wagner's biggest accomplishment was taking control of the main Russian military command base in the southern region of Rostov, and then sending convoys that seemed at the peak of this crisis that were rapidly approaching Moscow, largely unopposed.

I mean, they were being waved through. There really weren't any defense checkpoints, so it really seemed like there was a looming civil war [00:09:00] happening. But then out of the blue, , the crisis then ended with a deal negotiated by the Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko that granted Prighozen in amnesty within Belarus, and also agreed that any Wagner mercenaries , one, they would not be prosecuted.

But those not willing to sign a contract with the Russian military would be welcome to go to Belarus as [00:09:30] well. So just a really wild sequence of events and, , there's been information coming out but there's not, I think, great understanding of all the implications of, of what's happened so far.

I think the interesting things that have been noted in the last couple of days is that according to the New York Times, it seems like the mutiny were that none of the Wagner troops have actually taken [00:10:00] up residence within Belarus despite, , a number of, of tents being set up. So it's not clear exactly where they are.

And then Lukashenko came out saying that Prighozen himself, After going to Belarus had then returned to Russia and the Pentagon confirmed that it seemed like he has complete freedom of movement. He was first in St. Petersburg and now he's in Moscow. And this is despite being declared at the peak of the events, essentially enemy of the state and being granted [00:10:30] specifically this amnesty within Belarus.

But it seems like he has complete freedom of movement. So it's really not clear what's going on or on this arrangement. Is Wagner still in play? Are they being absorbed by the Russian military? What, what's going on? So what were your kind of thoughts on it? 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, so my take is one, this is, , I think a lot of people are guarded.

One of the most confusing there wasn't a coup precisely, but kind of in essence, it, it followed the rules of an attempted [00:11:00] coup. But. Kind of utterly confusing. It was confusing for people why he made this deal in the first place. And the assumption is that he really thought he had more support in Moscow, and then no one followed up on that.

So he was kind of forced to stop the troops and turn around. The calculation though in itself is pretty, it's a little bit surprising. I mean, one thing I've always thought was interesting about corrosion is that, , he [00:11:30] had more ability to speak out against the war than anyone else because other people who, in Russia who'd spoke out against the war other oligarchs, , ended up dead in some, some capacity.

So corrosion was kind of untouchable because he, , is the head of this big mercenary group that, , advances Russia's in interest in places like Syria and Africa. And so I thought that was always really interesting. And then it felt like he [00:12:00] was jeopardizing that there's only so much, , you can do to oppose Putin, it would seem, but now it's even more confusing because what is he doing in Russia?

So a lot of the take was that, oh, they're going to completely dismantle Wagner. , Putin realized that like other leaders have in the past that relying on large mercenary groups is ultimately a threat to your own power. But now it's really unclear of what is [00:12:30] going to happen. And I think this whole freedom of movement has taken a lot of people by surprise and they're not really sure how to react to it.

The thought was that, yeah, he went to Belarus and be lucky if he survived the month, , from some sort of. Assassination attack that Russia is kind of famous for. So, I mean, it's hard to have a clear sense. Obviously if, if everything is true and then he has freedom of movement and he [00:13:00] survives the next few months, he's more powerful in some ways than people thought.

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. It's, it's either the power or, I mean, is the, the other theory I've seen is that this is a big, like si psyop, that essentially this is a way for Putin to, in, in. In conjunction with Bri Rosen to suss out disloyalty [00:13:30] within the Russian military itself because I feel like that's the only concrete action that seems to have happened is that it appears that the deputy commander for the armed Russian armed forces in Ukraine has been detained and was seen as one that was closely tied to Prighozen.

And it's not clear Yeah, where the state of, of Wagner or the front lines, it hasn't really affected the defensive measures within Russia. Cuz most of Wagner's forces, if we remember, [00:14:00] had already been pulled off the front lines after the successful taking of, of Bak Mout. So yeah, it's just, it's just odd is it really show that the Putin regime is, is weak and that Prighozen in so powerful and has so many.

Internal connections, which I thought, , is apparent because there was a big leak that business Insider and devout reported this week that had gotten hold of Prighozen in's personal calendar [00:14:30] on his palm device cuz he is about, , 15, 20 years behind in terms of phone technologies.

And it became apparent, yeah, he was regularly meeting with very high level officials including Putin within the Kremlin on a pretty regular basis. So is it a measure of, of his power and connections, but at the same time then why did his effort fail if he's so powerful and he can avoid being arrested or assassinated despite being [00:15:00] back in Russia.

But his coup also failed, so he didn't have that level of support and power. So it's just odd. So I can see why this whole conspiracy of, oh, this is some elaborate psyop. There's even really dumb stuff where a lot of the far right who are fans of Putin was like, oh, this is a brilliant move to reposition Wagner forces into Belarus.

So it's easy to strike Kiev. Mm. That was really dumb because the [00:15:30] territory and defenses around kyiv are, are very tough. It's very tough to reign, to take rush, obviously put all of their forces and Wagner in order to take the equivalent of a couple kilometers within back moot. So there's no way in hell that they're going to be able to strike at, at Kiev.

So it's kind of a dumb thing, but at the same time, I can see this being such a confusing situation. This scene seeming like Putin is, is. Sending out weakness in, [00:16:00] in some form that people would then turn to. This is some sort of elaborate collusion. I don't know exactly what it accomplishes through this collusion other than Yeah, you, you suss out people disloyal at the highest levels within the Russian military.

But yeah, it's just, it's all a little bit inexplicable. 

Anita Kellogg: I think, , in the beginning it followed a kind of typical kind of pattern for attempted cos where you have 48 hours of just complete, no one knows what's going on. Just kind [00:16:30] of complete chaos, , no reliable news reports. And it's not unusual for attempted COOs.

I mean, it's obviously not unusual. Most, most of them fail, very few succeed. And then what they. Harbinger for the leader is often the governments find themselves out of power within a year or two. So they usually do signal some sort of weakness, but not always, . Chavez survived in attempted coup in [00:17:00] 2002, I believe, and he emerged much stronger.

He purged, , the state oil company in other really important places. He purged about half for disloyalty and kind of took control. So there is that, but a lot of times they're also signal of weakness. And so everyone's been trying to figure out, well, is Putin weak or not? This whole conspiracy theory actually kind of, I saw like it emerge on Twitter pretty much as soon as [00:17:30] he withdrew pulled back as troops from Moscow.

At the time I was like, that's ridiculous. I don't believe it. But now, It seems more plausible than it did before with the 

Ryan Kellogg: whole freedom of movement within Russia. 

Anita Kellogg: Mm-hmm. Yeah. Yeah. So, so it does seem strange. The thing that seems most strange to me about it is that it does still make Putin look weak.

Even if this was something that he and corrosion cooked up together. It makes, it definitely makes [00:18:00] Putin seem weaker. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. And it's, I mean, Proghozin still loses control over, I mean, I, I don't think I've seen numbers of the forces within Wagner that have taken up as they were required to do, or flee to Belarus or to, to Africa or the Middle East to fulfill their contract.

How many have like signed the contract with the Russian military? I, I don't know. So it still feels [00:18:30] like. That he's lost more, even if this was a collusion, but maybe, yeah, maybe it's just, yeah, it's just not clear. It seems 

Anita Kellogg: both of them lost, right? Yeah. Yeah. And so that's what makes it kind of confusing.

I really was surprised I that he would go to Belarus or stay there for any time because I felt for sure he would go to Africa, where Wagner has, , its own EF Dems and I thought he might be more untouchable in Africa. [00:19:00] So all of this is kind of surprising and confusing and , a lot of drama.

Right. When you, you would think Russia needs would want unity because of the war, right? Right. And it kind of shows reveals how Long Wars, right. Obviously they expected complete victory within a very short amount of time. Long wars that are not going well are often. Do you threaten leader survivability?

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. [00:19:30] And I think, and probably the other thing that presses against the idea of this secret collusion is Prighozen went very publicly right before the coup and very harsh language condemning the war. Mm-hmm. Condemning why the war was being carried out. Mm-hmm. How it was being executed. The very premise and heart of the war, which is much more than he went to in his pre, I mean, because he's been on social media a lot and ranted mm-hmm.

About the lack of support and going against [00:20:00] and how it's being 

Anita Kellogg: fought defense 

Ryan Kellogg: and how it's being fought. Yeah. So that, that part of it, that one piece of evidence seems like, yeah, this isn't collusion because why fake that and really undermine and have, cuz that has the real ability to sink in. Cuz it, its seemed from the coup that Wagner was.

Very popular with the public. Mm-hmm. , especially in the, the southern rosta area. I mean, people were, were cheering them on. So yeah, it's, it's, yeah. [00:20:30] It's a real, it's a real mystery cuz they're definitely conflicting views and it's, it's still all playing out. But 

Anita Kellogg: I think, , I want to clarify that.

In no way does it seem like Precursion would be a better leader than Putin. He Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Right. I think people embraced it only as a sign of weakness on Putin's part and the hope that, yeah. That there's some potential for a post Putin and maybe a post piece. [00:21:00] 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. Yeah. No, I think it, yeah, it just makes the, it would make the job for Ukraine much easier.

Mm-hmm. If you had. Obviously a civil war or chaos mm-hmm. Within Russia. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. They would probably begin pulling troops mm-hmm. Off of the defensive lines. Mm-hmm. That's the only effect. I don't think anybody should be under the illusion that, that, I mean, Prighozen may well be worse than, than Putin, if that's, that's imaginable.

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, definitely. I just think that has to [00:21:30] be clarified because Yeah, it has seemed that, to some people, I'd interpreted, oh, everybody wants corrosion to replace Putin, and that would be a, a really terrible scenario. Certainly no better. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, yeah. So just kind of a confusing situation and then kind of curious about what you have on the counter offensive, how it's going.

Ryan Kellogg: Yes. I think that was the, The one negatives was the great hope that this would [00:22:00] somehow have a positive impact on the counter offensive. But because this all played out over a couple days, it essentially had had zero impact. So overall, the, the counter offensive has been going on for roughly a month now, and the progress has been very slow.

On both the Eastern and southern fronts. At this stage, most of the NATO train Ukrainian forces, so those nine brigades that we talked about last time have [00:22:30] yet to be committed in any way. With most of the Ukraine focused on probing attacks, trying to look for weak spots, , particularly on the, the Southern Russian defensive lines.

Now they have had some success. They've been able to liberate seven villages over the time, but it only represents about 50 square square miles, which the Financial Times and New York Times with had had good maps just showing how far they are at this [00:23:00] stage from accomplishing the military objective of severing the land bridge that connects the Russia to Crimea.

So, The other disconcerting thing is that there's still probably 15, 20 kilometers away from the really heavily fortified front lines that make up the southern zappia region within Ukraine which is really necessary to, to sever [00:23:30] that land bridge. And there's just a number of challenges once they, they reach that point.

And we talked about it before, but again, the, the New York Times article that came out on June 28th had some really good illustrations just talking about, , one, the manmade challenges which include. Russians have had a year now to dig, , anti-tank ditches, install these concrete dragon teeth razor wire and lots of minefields.

But then it's also the terrain [00:24:00] itself. So Ukrainian forces, as they're proceeding, , with these armored units are highly exposed. They have to advance across open fields while the Russian forces, , one, they're dug into the trenches, but those deployed in the field are hidden behind tree lines.

So they have considerable camouflage, especially in the summer when all the trees have, have leaves on them. So it just makes it very difficult to, to advance I think providing more color to, this was a Washington Post [00:24:30] article that interviewed the Head, Ukrainian general Valerie zany and he was really citing the lack of artillery shells at this point, which ties into some of the, the news this week and the lack of air support, which has constantly been a theme as the reason that.

Eventually the f sixteens were, were granted, but as we talked about before, it's not going to arrive in time to be part of this, this counter [00:25:00] offensive. But I think especially the, the artillery shells, which Ukrainian forces are still being out shelled 10 to one by Russian forces and this lack of shells really reflects again the the lack of production capacity within the West.

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. So I have a couple of points. And first I just wanna say that there was another article that came out talking about the front lines of the Ukrainian military and [00:25:30] how they're having trouble replacing bodies. People are dying so quickly and such, and so I was having this discussion on Twitter with a colleague and was mentioning the New Yorker article that we were talking about.

But one of the facts in this counteroffensive is they still have not deployed most of the NATO trained troops. Right. And we were talking about military strategy a little bit, which I admittedly do not know much about despite where I work. But the strategy of holding [00:26:00] back to many of your troops while you're having trouble replacing enough people, enough bodies on the front line.

And of course the reason for doing so they say is to find the weakness points, but it's still is kind of an interesting strategy. The other thing you were talking about ammunitions, and so recently they announced the decision for the US to send cluster munitions to the Ukraine and these ammunitions that explode [00:26:30] above where you have a lot of people.

That's probably a bad explanation. How should I explain 

Ryan Kellogg: it? Yeah, I mean essentially it's a, it's a form of artillery that releases a bunch of omelets. So it's almost like a scattered, shotgun, shotgun approach. Now, I think that the big criticism around it was, 

Anita Kellogg: was that not all of these go off, right?

Right. So about anyone has talked about a failure rate of 5% to maybe more. [00:27:00] And the problem with this is it creates a lot of civilian deaths as they come upon these unexploded, unexploded munitions, right? Yeah. Yep. And so, 120 countries have actually banned the use in production of these weapons. The US is one of the few not to do so, but there is a law that might be being violated about using or providing them if they have more than 1% figure rate.

Which so far there hasn't been one de [00:27:30] designed that meets that requirement. So there is usually this ethical concern about any weapon that, that ends up with a lot of civilian casualties. Now, the interesting thing in this ethics discussion is that Ukrainians themselves want to use it in Ukraine. And so the ethical consideration there is if you're fighting for your freedom from another country, [00:28:00] do you get to decide how many civilian casualties you're willing to tolerate from the type of weapons that you're using?

Yeah. 

Ryan Kellogg: And to me, I, I mean, I, I don't think any moral consideration apply in this case. I mean, I think, yeah, the Ukrainians need it. They requested it. The Russians have been using these type of munitions against Ukrainians this entire war. Yeah. And then the way that the White House framed it, I thought was interesting pointing out the, Hey, we have a lack of [00:28:30] production capacity until this gets ramped up.

This is what we got 

Anita Kellogg: left. Yeah. So most of this is quite old. There hasn't been really new production, as far as I understand, of these bombs because they're so controversial. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. I mean, they have been so, they were used in the Iraq war and they were also initially supplied to Saudi Arabia and the war against Yemen, but then was cut off because of the obvious criticisms because of civilian casualties.

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. So, I mean, you can't take away ethical concerns at [00:29:00] all considering that this, this is a weapon that just has ethical concerns, but at the same time, in this situation, it seems warranted. Or that they should get to make that decision themselves. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. Yeah, exactly. Yeah. And then going back to, to your point on the kind of the, the probing the lines as a, as an offensive strategy, it seems like, , the, the hope is to, to, to find that weak [00:29:30] point and, and, and try to, to break through.

But I think it's also, , these, we, we talked about these are NATO train forces, but I think the key part that is missing from how a NATO's strategy would be is that it na would've carried out three or four weeks of a constant bombing campaign. Mm-hmm. And it's just this complete lack of not only the ability to, to carry out.

Preemptive bombing campaign, but then to be [00:30:00] able to have the air support to defend the advancing tank units while they're exposed in these fields. And it's I mean, it just feels like a, a big gap. I think it goes back to the way that the Biden administration has released weapon systems piecemeal over time.

Mm-hmm. Was this a huge strategic mistake? I mean, especially if the counter offensive ends up running up against what has been a outperforming [00:30:30] Russian military in terms of the quality of their defensive encampments and the resistance that they've been putting up. Are people going to look back and say, why didn't you provide the tanks, the f sixteens, these longer range missiles a year ago so that it would actually have an effect and you, we could end this war?

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, I think that's definitely something that people will go back and look at as a, as a critical factor. I think [00:31:00] in the beginning it definitely made sense because I think there was a real risk of escalation with Russia, but to some extent is it's continued, this piecemeal strategy doesn't necessarily make sense other than from the practical negotiation viewpoint.

Whereas when they supplied the tanks, they probably at the time didn't think that they were going to be willing to supply the F sixteens. So the sort of strategy is hampered just by the fact of the government trying to [00:31:30] decide on what what it's willing to part with and what it's thinks is, can be strategically used in Ukraine.

Yeah, 

Ryan Kellogg: yeah, yeah, for sure. But I mean, going back to the manpower if that ends up being the main constraint for Ukraine in terms of waging a. A longer term war. I mean, I think it's, it's still seen as, do they have much more than the next six months to accomplish whatever military goals before [00:32:00] they're forced into, into some sort of peace talks?

And I thought that was another interesting news that came out. Yeah. Was NBC had a report that US officials had been meeting at, at, at least at the foreign minister level mm-hmm. With Russia back in April and New York around potentially setting the table for eventual peace talks. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. A couple interesting things about that.

One, of course, that these were secret talks and there is it's unfortunate perhaps [00:32:30] that this was leak. Because it's, it's more effective when you can have these talks in secret. I believe there was a lot of condemnation by little, a lot of people, at least that I saw on Twitter. And to explain my Twitter is mostly full of academics and news personalities, and so it's not like the normal trolls and awfulness.

But but there was still, , some reaction against doing this, , while Russia is launching this, , terrible war. But really the reality is you have to [00:33:00] be, of course, be bad if the US wasn't meeting at this level to try to set some potential for peace talks in the future. So, , as I'll talk about with China, this whole idea that you don't talk to your competitors or enemies even is really problematic and you can't really accomplish anything that way.

So I think the pushback should definitely be that. This is actually a, a good sign that Russia's at least willing to talk to the United States [00:33:30] about potential peace, even if, , that's not really on the table right now. 

Ryan Kellogg: Right, right. Yeah, and I thought the, the other interesting part, I, I think from that same report was on the Ukrainian perspective, again, I think secret discussions that were leaked, but obviously their public position is the retaking of all Ukrainian territory, including the 2014 seizures of, of Crimea and the Donbass area.

[00:34:00] But in reality, what they've said is that if we can sever that land bridge and put Crimea under direct threat, they feel pretty confident that that'll force Russia to negotiate, which kind of implies that they would be willing to negotiate then. And you would have a path, but it does imply that they, they have to smash through these defensive lines mm-hmm.

And, and have a pretty successful counter offensive to, to get to that point. And it's, it's [00:34:30] not clear they're going to be able to get there. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. , I think that shows, , what Alexander Vindman was saying, there will only be a negotiation after, , some Ukrainian victory. And so, , Ukraine needs a big victory to force Putin to the negotiating table.

Yep. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. No, and I think, I mean around this specific issue and around weapon system, I think vin's really been vindicated mm-hmm. In, in this entire, cuz [00:35:00] essentially Yeah. If they had done kind of as he is, , arm Ukraine mm-hmm. To win this war at the beginning, a year ago. I think we'd have a much different story to tell at this stage.

Yeah, 

Anita Kellogg: yeah. Yeah. So I mean, I think all conflicts are clear when you look at them in hindsight. But yeah, I think it's been vindicated and I think even our earlier, our skepticism to that did not hold up very well. Right. Yep. [00:35:30] Except I will say, I think at that time there may have been more risk of escalation than there is now.

Perhaps 

Ryan Kellogg: it, yeah. It's, or it's hard to tell. Yeah, it's always hard to tell, but at least 

Anita Kellogg: the perception. I think it's important that, that we didn't want to create a situation where Putin felt the need to escalate, even if it turned out that it was mostly a bluff on his part. So [00:36:00] there's also been a fair amount of news about China right now.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. Is in China, meeting with her counterparts trying to communicate that the bevy of US measures blocking access to sensitive technology such as semiconductors in the name of national security, as well as potential limits on US investment in China are not intended to afflict harm on the Chinese economy, [00:36:30] which I feel is almost an impossible task.

Or certainly the idea that she could get new economic deals because what the US one is debatable whether the US is considering some sort of containment of China. Certainly there are many who argue for it in actual actions. Obviously they're not containment, but there, there is some element to that. I mean, part of the national security concern is to make sure that Russia doesn't get technology [00:37:00] that's more advanced than the United States.

To be used in their sort of drones and, and other military capabilities. I think, , given that the US also has all these tariffs on China still, which Yellen has, has opposed I think it's hard to say that, oh, the US is talking about de-risking, it's talking about all these other elements. Yes, it wants to, , but say this is just national security and we are still [00:37:30] wanting to have a, a win-win relationship, which is what she needs to communicate, but it kind of a very difficult message under current tensions.

Yeah, I 

Ryan Kellogg: I, I really don't know how you walk that, that line. Because yeah, I mean, all the messages certainly being sent by Washington and certainly from Congress are. Around containing China, certainly [00:38:00] preventing its further rise or any sort of further change in the balance of power within the the Pacific.

So how do you try to go back? I mean, I, I mean, I think to, to the point that you've brought up in previous episodes around trade volume and the fact that, , there's not really a decoupling per se. Mm-hmm. I 

Anita Kellogg: mean trade volume, volume, well, they've gotten rid of the term decoupling now, which is interesting.

Right. 

Ryan Kellogg: The de-risking. Yeah. So that's strictly [00:38:30] focused on items important to national security. However, those are defined and they have 

Anita Kellogg: been, that's the problem is defining national security is something 

Ryan Kellogg: very broad. Yeah. It can be very broad. I mean, I know we've discussed before, kind of, I mean, they did put out a memo, but it did include, , 30 different items that could be broadly interpreted mm-hmm.

In different sectors that were, were seen as key to to, to national security. Well, also 

Anita Kellogg: just the idea of the threat to American Jobs is considered part of national security. 

Ryan Kellogg: Right. And I think it's more of [00:39:00] a, and I think to your point about the tariffs is if we were really serious that this was de-risking mm-hmm.

Obviously, who cares about, , the cheap plastic toys. Mm-hmm. Why should they have a 25% tariff on them? , everything that's, that's found in, in Walmart, how's that related to, to national security? But yeah, if you tie it to American jobs, but of course we know heading into election season, that would be politically toxic to then, , to get rid of these, these tariffs.

So that's a, a [00:39:30] non-starter, but it just shows the, the hypocrisy of trying to go. Talk about, yeah, we want, this can be a win-win situation that we're not trying to contain China, but in reality, what are our actions telling China? Right? 

Anita Kellogg: And there's certainly not very positive. The same time China's also ing up it's economic weaponization by limiting the export of [00:40:00] two metals that are critical to the manufacturing and semiconductor.

So this is gallium and Germanium China supplies about 80% of the world's gallium and germanium, although there's more diversification of the Germanian supply. So. What, what happens? This is kind of interesting because it's not sort of like the supposed export bans in the past where nothing was officially said.

It was all just supposed to [00:40:30] be like verbal communication from the government to businesses to say, , don't actually, , be sending these minerals such as the rare earth minerals. Banned to Japan for a couple of months. It was all unofficial. So this is almost more in line what happened previous to that controversy, which happened in September of 2010.

In August of 2010 basically China had the clear that it would decrease its exports and [00:41:00] many minerals by 40%. A lot of people saw this to drive prices and not so much the kind of weaponization that we're seeing now. So to take this sort of official stance is, is kind of more in line with the other tactic.

It's just really, really hard to say. What will come of it? So exporters for the two metals will need to apply for licenses from the commerce ministry. They want to start or continue to ship them out of the country. And this has just been really important because they [00:41:30] play a role producing a number of compounds, semiconductors, of course, , the targeting of these metals is, is not accidental.

It's a response to the export limits of semiconductors and equipment to China imposed by several countries. So what, so it's really not clear either, like how much the, the reduced exports will be, but the market is expecting it to significantly affect gallium, which as I mentioned, [00:42:00] the world is more dependent on and rose to $326 a kilogram on Friday, which is up from $43 a week ago.

So that's, that's definitely an early sign that buyers are seeking to shore up supplies before the export controls kick in in August. But germanium, which is also subject to the section, saw a much smaller impact rising 1.9%. So the effect will definitely be more expense in semiconductors. It'll probably also delay the production [00:42:30] of items that need those semiconductor chips to be operational.

So these talks are happening in that context. I think people talk a lot about, , the downsides of China weaponizing this, this creates a lot more supply diversification. But there definitely will be significant short to medium term effects because it takes time to be able to mine these minerals and be able to have a production process in fact.

The US I was [00:43:00] reading an article is just beginning a production plant near the mine in California. Right. And there's still a lot to learn about the technique of processing these minerals, which China doesn't have a monopoly anymore on on providing the minerals, but they do have a monopoly on processing the materials.

And it's just about, , it's not even about the plants, it's about the technical knowhow and how to do that. I think it would've been surprising if China was just going to [00:43:30] sit around and say, that's fine. You, , you're limiting these semiconductor chips to us. We'll just make some more of our own when they don't have the technology yet to meet these sort of advanced chips.

So, of course, China is going to have some response and it's, it's the kind of smart response because, well here we're going to make it harder for you to manufacture those chips that you would no longer send us. I think this is also important because in the case studies I've done, one of the things that kept China from [00:44:00] weaponizing where Earth Minerals effectively is because they needed the semiconductor chips that were made of those minerals.

So going back to the controversy in 2010 about an export ban on shipping where Earth minerals to Japan, it was very short lived to the extent that it existed, all which there's some controversy about Japan's records and not showing a substantial drop in, in the imports from China, but also China.

This happened for like maybe two months since it happened [00:44:30] because, , China couldn't, China needed the semiconductor chips from, for its own manufacturing. And so when you take out, when you're like, well, we're not going to send you those manufacturing chips, after all, it definitely gives China more incentive to weaponize these minerals.

Ryan Kellogg: And so I think going back to your point on the kind of the rear earth argument and the fact that led to greater diversification in terms of the, the [00:45:00] production. So if prices do, of supply. Of supply, yeah. So if prices do go up in the, the short to medium term and it creates that incentive and China loses market share, I mean, doesn't that really end up hurting them?

I mean, how does this, it definitely does benefit them in any way. How is this an effective punishment? It, I mean, it seems weak sauce compared to what the West is effectively doing by denying them, , these very advanced chips [00:45:30] or the production equipment needed to create their own advanced chips as the Dutch company.

I can't remember the name of it but they agreed, agreed to cut off Any exports to China as well for their most advanced manufacturing circuitry kind of process. Mm-hmm. Involved for semiconductors. Yeah. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. Yeah, you're right. And a lot of people have brought that up that this may actually harm China in the long run.

I think the idea is [00:46:00] to, to pressure western in the short term, right? I mean, to diversify supply and production, let's just say a minimum of five year process. So there's a lot of squeeze on the west in producing semiconductor ships to some extent, depending on how much they limit it in the, in the short 

Ryan Kellogg: term.

Right. And I guess that's, that won't be clear until it's actually enacted. Mm-hmm. Because there you have this licensing [00:46:30] process, but there weren't, unlike the. I guess 2010 incident, there weren't specific reductions. Like you mentioned, a 40% reduction. There's been no, like, right. We're reducing it by X percent.

Right. So the market's reaction is strictly a little bit of a Yes. Hey, we're concerned about our short term supply for gallium, so that drives up prices. People wanting to secure this amount before that, right, this August 1st date, which has uncertainty is 

Anita Kellogg: enacted, [00:47:00] right? Yeah. So I mean, basically all China can do is respond by creating economic pain in the most strategic way possible, because at minimum it's going to drive up prices and, , be economically costly.

But how significant that is is still probably pretty limited overall. 

Ryan Kellogg: And then do you think we're going to see what we saw with rare Earths where there's cheating. By Chinese businesses, if there [00:47:30] are like strict export restrictions or around licensing where do you think this is so high profile that this will be enforced and no Chinese business is going to like risk running those?

I mean cuz that was before she this is the who Genau period. Mm-hmm. The original incident. But you think that's, that's a possibility too, that it won't even be effective keeping supply off the market if that is the goal. 

Anita Kellogg: I think that's a really interesting question. Because there was so much cheating, again, to the extent that we can know [00:48:00] that a ban was in place.

I think one thing that allowed for that is that the unofficial nature of it, again, because there wasn't an actual process like this is to apply for the license. Mm-hmm. But yes, I think there will be cheating. Mm-hmm. But not maybe enough to make up for the supply. And cut. I, I think it, one of the most significant aspects of it is the, that this is an official process and not not unofficial, which I think says a lot about what China believes [00:48:30] it can accomplish.

I think in those other situations, it really thought it could influence the foreign policy decisions of those countries, whereas I think China's not betting on the west to change its mind, but wants to impose some sort of economic penalty on the west. 

Ryan Kellogg: And should we read anything on the timing being right before Yellen's visit?

Is that a big middle finger to Yellen or can you ask? I mean, 

Anita Kellogg: maybe, I think it also, like we said, just the [00:49:00] tone of relations have been so bad and it may be a sign like of China saying, , we're not defenseless before the, before the talks. 

Ryan Kellogg: Right. So it'd be blinking didn't accomplish as much in kind of the initial conversations 

Anita Kellogg: earlier.

I mean, I think the fact is, whatever conversations we have, we haven't lifted the export ban on semiconductors. So how much? Sure. Yeah. Right. So as long as you don't do that, then China's going to want [00:49:30] to create some punishment for that to the extent that it's able to. Right. I think, , one of the, I don't think Yellen is going to accomplish anything.

I don't think there's going to be any significant new deals that come out of this, but I do think it's a good thing for Blinken and for Yellen to be having conversations. Right. Especially amidst all this, , tit for tat other, , economic penalties that both countries are trying to impose on each other, that you need to at least be having a dialogue.

And I think Yellen is a good [00:50:00] person to deliver a dialogue that is More, more open, or at least can be more convincingly sincere in saying that we're not trying to hurt China's economy as a whole. 

Ryan Kellogg: Yeah. And it seems like if there's any substantial conversations, they focused on the areas where I think both parties have generally agreed that there might eventually be cooperation around things like climate change and debt relief in, in the third world.

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, I think debt relief is probably an [00:50:30] important conversation that she's having. Yeah. So yeah, so I don't think people should look at the lack of, , significant agreements or even change between the US and China as failures. I think it's, it's a success in kind of opening up dialogue between the two countries and regardless of, I mean, obviously you hope for things not to get worse, I think that's what you're hoping to accomplish and maybe decrease those tension somewhat.

Right. Right. So I think [00:51:00] move on to my interview with Dan Hamilton and as I said before, we discussed various aspects of the US Europe transatlantic relationship. , certainly talking about how the Ukraine war, the uncertainty of us future commitments, and then how China is both pushing Europe and the US together and also creating some risks between them.

But I thought one of the interesting discussions we had, and this is based on an article he recently wrote, [00:51:30] is is a plan for over the next decade Europe should work on being less dependent on US for defense. And he implied that at least half of that is a matter of the US letting Europe develop those capabilities.

And, , so I pushed back a little bit on to what extent this is about. Us, , putting aside some of its special interest and letting Europe develop those cap capabilities. And on the other hand, just Europe not wanting to commit the money and efforts to that. So I think it was an interesting [00:52:00] discussion and I hope you enjoy.

My name is Dr. Anita Kellogg and I'm here with Dan Hamilton, a senior fellow at both the Brookings Institution and the Foreign Policy Institute of John Hopkins University Size. He's also the president of the Transatlantic Leadership Network. Hi Dan. Thank you so much for coming on the show. Glad to be with you.

Well, to get started, US commitment to the war in Ukraine seemed to heal many of the fractures in the US Europe relationship that came [00:52:30] about during the Trump administration. Alongside this has been the reinvigoration of nato. Is Europe more confident in the US long-term commitment to the region? 

Daniel Hamilton: Well, I think , war has the effect of concentrating the mind.

So far, Vladimir Putin's greatest accomplishment with his war is toe Europe and the United States, like they haven't been united since, probably after the terrorist attacks September 11th, 2001. And I think [00:53:00] there's been a real commitment here. The NATO summit last summer was very strong in it, in its commitments.

It released a new strategic concept. There was unity. Despite obvious differences all the time. The upcoming building a summit in July is likely to display that unity once again. But I think , the other consequence of the war has been to heighten Europe's de dependence on the United States.

And I think that's become also clear that without the [00:53:30] us take sh taking the leadership that it has on Ukraine. It's doubtful really whether our European allies would've been able to manage the situation or support the Ukrainians in the way that we all have now. So I think there are some questions.

I think the other question is, while the Europeans are delighted at Joe Biden's leadership and the fact that he is a, a deep transatlanticists, they often ask questions, , what comes next? Mm-hmm. And I think they're looking to the next elections in the [00:54:00] United States in 2024. And so there's a little hedging going on in terms of your question about the long-term commitment for the United States, and I think the Europeans are still wondering a little bit about that.

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. So one thing kind of going to what you said is something that you've written about is the rebalancing of Europe and transatlantic defense. So can you explain what you mean by this? 

Daniel Hamilton: Sure there are, , a lot of voices out there saying, , we [00:54:30] should just let the Europeans take care of themselves.

And there are a lot of voices in Europe saying, , we shouldn't be so dependent on the United States. We should break free and be autonomous and so on. Sometimes those arguments are more divisive than they are constructive. But I don't disagree with the premise that Europe's over-reliance in the United States for security is not healthy for either side of the Atlantic.

But I, I and others are proposing that we think about it. How do we get to [00:55:00] a situation in which there's a better balance over the next say decade? Cuz it takes a long time to sort of, , do the kind of defense needs that would be really answering that question. So instead of, , a daily , short, short-term discussion, I think we need to set some long-term goals.

And we need to square a triangle of concern. So one is we need to defer deter and defend against Russia. We need to allow [00:55:30] Europe to have a greater voice, but also a greater contribution to our common security. And the United States, , has commitments globally, but particularly both in the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific theaters.

And I think there's concern that given all of those commitments, we might be stretched in that there are simultaneous crises. The United States might not be able to come to Europe's defense and the way the Europeans sometimes [00:56:00] expect it, not because we don't want to, but because again, of these stretched commitments.

So those are three challenges. So the proposal is to think of simple, simply, maybe over simply, but two goals. Between now and say a decade from now. One is Europe should be able to provide half of the capabilities and the enabling capabilities to deter and defend against Russia. Right now, [00:56:30] Europe doesn't actually do half of those that job, and I don't think that's sustainable.

I don't think American public opinion or the US Congress will, , think that's fair. And I don't think the Europeans think that that's a very, very, , not a reliable partner for themselves. So let's work on that. But that'll take quite a bit of time. But it's a, it's realistic and it's doable and it would be seen as fair.

The second goal would be that Europe [00:57:00] should be the first responder to crises in and around its southern periphery. Right now there is concerns, , in, in many southern European countries about all sorts of challenges in the South, but often the United States is the one who has to provide, , either the airlift or the communications, the logistics to allow the Europeans to address some of those issues.

And sometimes NATO's called on to do things that , frankly, the European [00:57:30] Union or others might be able to do better. So, if we can work to the kind of capabilities that allow Europe to be that first responder, it doesn't mean the US wouldn't be there, or NATO wouldn't be there. It is just that we shouldn't be first or we shouldn't be expected to always be in the frontline on those issues.

I think if we could, , address those two strategic goals within the course of a decade. So it is, does, it is not, it's not easy. And that's not short term. [00:58:00] I think we would have a better balanced relationship that would allow the Europe to, to be the partner it wants to be. It'll allow us to defer, defend against Russia and the South, and it would help the US balance its commitments so that we're not, , caught in some difficult trade-offs.

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. You mentioned that, , the US should allow Europe to do this, but it seems more on the European side to be unwilling to truly invest, to be this kind of [00:58:30] partner. For example, I mean, when I lived in Amsterdam almost two decades ago, , there, there was this movement of, then they're talking about what they could do to be more take control of more defense issues and not rely on the us but for all this time, They don't seem to have made any progress on it and seem kind of almost content to rely on the US for their security challenges.

So how realistic do you think it is to accomplishing [00:59:00] this? What would it take to get Europe to make this sort of commitment? Well, 

Daniel Hamilton: I think it works both ways. I think US has often had rhetorical support for stronger European defense, but it comes down to some details. Often we question it. I think there's, we would like to control it more than we might admit sometimes.

There's also, of course, a very, , very practical issues of arms the defense industry. Mm-hmm. The arms [00:59:30] industry, who gets the contracts when you do things like this. So, , practical interests are involved here, which complicate it on the European side. As you say, there's always the voices for this, but then it never seems to turn into anything.

So the question really now is, is Europe serious about moving ahead on this? And will the US sort of get out of the way and let them do some of this too? I think the US is ready for that. There is a, something seems technical but important was the US just [01:00:00] signed what's called an administrative agreement with the European Union to allow all sorts of new types of interactions in, in that space.

The u EU has allowed now third parties, so meaning non-eu, meaning say the US or Turkey or the UK to participate in certain kinds of defense projects if their expertise is needed. So there is some movement. It's, it's marginal, but there's movement. And then you see some new [01:00:30] initiatives. There's European Defense Agency and the, and the EU has all these acronyms, , but they have mm-hmm.

Basically building modules projects that they work on together. And that this modular approach means that for any particular kind of project, a third country could participate, say a company from a third country if they have this expertise that the Europeans lack. So it's a way to build the European capacity without being , protections [01:01:00] that'll be tested, , in the practical realities of certain cases.

But you see initiatives that are interesting. So Germany, for instance, has proposed a Sky Shield that is a defensive shield over a whole part, big part of Europe against Russian, , air threats. And they're moving ahead faster than people realize, and they've done interesting contracting to do that.

The problem of course, then is the French say, well, that, that, we don't like that [01:01:30] because you didn't contract our companies. And so now our, we'll build a different shield. So this is Europe and this is the reality. So there might, I think there will be a kind of a defensive initiative along those lines in Europe, but it might have different parts to it.

And that's just the, the nature of Europe. But it's better than not having it at all. And so I think if you compare the conversation today with the conversation four or five years [01:02:00] ago, or certainly 20 years ago when you were in Amsterdam it has moved pretty far ahead. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, those are all really interesting points and definitely the type of initiatives that are going on right now.

So I wanna move on to China and. On one hand, Europe does seem to have moved closer to the US perspective by acknowledging the strategic challenges presented by China. On the other hand, your French president McComb's call for strategic autonomy [01:02:30] from the US on the Taiwan issue, which resonated in much of Europe.

Where does Europe stand on US-China competition? 

Daniel Hamilton: Well, I think if you compare the conversation the US and Europe are having on China today with the one, say two years ago, there's been significant movement, I think there's much closer alignment on many aspects than there was then with the Europeans moving toward a, , basically a tougher [01:03:00] approach.

But there's not a European view. I mean, this is not a debate between the US and Europe. It's a debate the Europeans are having among themselves about their respective relationships with China. So I think one has to keep that in mind just as we have debates in the United States about China, and there's more of a robust debate about it than I think people in Europe give it credit for.

The Europeans are having this debate. So Mr. Macron really didn't speak for [01:03:30] Europe when he made those comments. In fact, he got actually more blow back from other Europeans than support. So, and he's been quite quiet on those issues since he gave that speech. It's interesting, the German national security strategy, which was just released , about a week or so ago, doesn't even mention the words strategic autonomy.

So, so much for that term. I think that's an antiquated term. I don't think it has consensus anymore within the [01:04:00] eu. Our finished colleagues , new members of nato, but long-term members of the eu, they talk about strategic responsibility. And I think that's a better term that aligns more with how the US would think about things.

On the other hand, the Biden administration has lifted directly language from European Commission President Fundly about our economic approach to China, not being about decoupling, but what she calls de-risking. Sullivan specifically said, we [01:04:30] are taking her term because that actually is better term than the decoupling metaphor.

So the US has also, , come back on this. If you look hard, I think both sides are aligned basically around the notion that you're, that China is a strategic , systemic rival. And that's more where the locus of concern is now. The NATO strategic concept last summer says it very clearly that China is the China challenge to the alliance.

So that's a [01:05:00] consensus document. You'll see more of it at the V summit. There is growing concern about China as a competitor not just in the economic realm, but in a variety of other areas. And the Europeans are focused on that. There's much more movement, for instance, to oust Huawei from systems that had been there in Europe and not really being paid attention to.

But I, we come back to the, the third part of the [01:05:30] triangle. The Europeans used to describe China, which is partner. So here, I think this is where there's some disagreement, but I, I think if you delve into the details, you see there's less maybe disagreement than one might think. Many European countries say China's still a com partner for us on issues like climate change on economic.

, ties, lots of different things like that. Pandemic, we have to get that right. We shouldn't have what we had last time. , health [01:06:00] issues, all sorts of other kinds of transnational issues. The United States is saying basically the Biden administration is saying there are areas in which we wanna work with China.

And so that includes climate change and others. And so, , I don't know how far apart they really are on that. I just don't think we've come up with a snappy formula, , to, to capture this. I think the EU triad partner, competitor, systemic rival, , kind of does capture this, but it's, [01:06:30] it's not evenly weighted, I guess is the, is where the conversation has moved.

It's more to the competitive rival part than the partner part. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, I mean that's really interesting. And I was thinking as you were speaking too about, on one hand you have, you do have actions like on Huawei that kind of fit into this strategic competition. But on, on the other hand, despite talk of de-risking, you have an addition to Macron.

You had the Prime [01:07:00] Minister Schultz travel to China only a few weeks before emphasizing trade partnerships between the two countries. So how much of this is talk versus actual actions? 

Daniel Hamilton: Well, as I say, it's uneven. There's not a European view. They're fighting about this every day, about. Mm-hmm. So I think you have to break it down and look at different countries and sort of the debates those countries are having.

Certainly in Eastern Europe you see a real stiffening [01:07:30] against China. , China had created something called the 16 plus one. At one point it was 17 European countries plus one, the China working on infrastructure projects and, and all sorts of things that's kind of falling apart. The number of countries have bailed out of that.

It doesn't seem to have much of a future. , there's been real tensions between China and a country like Lithuania, which was promoting relations with Taiwan. So, , I think that's, that's different. [01:08:00] France is struggling with this. But I don't think actually French policy reflects macro Crohn's headline speech that people refer to because they immediately backtracked even on their own policy.

And France signed many declarations since then that are quite aligned with broader, , Western positions. Italy has cracked down a bit harder. It had signed a, it was part of the Belton Road Initiative of China, and they're seeking a way out of that. [01:08:30] So I don't think that that's going anywhere really.

And , you can go through the list of countries. So Germany becomes of course, as usual the, the swing state here. And it is interesting, they're struggling because the German model had been tied into, , the Chinese market. And just as Germany had become dependent on Russia for its energy and dependent on the United States for its security, it, it had growingly become dependent on [01:09:00] China for its economic model.

And the Germans, , were celebrating that. They're one of the only countries in the world that had a trade surplus with China. But that's because they're exporting all things to China, that China is now exporting back to them. Mm-hmm. China's sort of building Germany in China. It's building essentially the same German model.

That made Germany says a powerhouse. It is a manufacturing model built on export, , prowess. And many of the [01:09:30] kind of areas that Germany used to export to China now are being flipped And Germany's finding that it's no longer that dominant partner. And so you see that reflected in some concern.

The, and, and I think there's a difference between sort of business community discussions in Germany and the politics. So the national security strategy, Germany is recent. One mentioned China as more of a systemic rival. It doesn't break from the EU frame that I [01:10:00] mentioned, but it, it does stress rival, but it doesn't go as far as it does with Russia.

, in terms of breaking this notion that you should wean yourself off your addiction, , to an authoritarian country. So the Chinese had a major delegation in, in Berlin last week meeting with Chancellor Schultz and his ministers. There was no discussion publicly of Taiwan. There was no, , indication that there [01:10:30] was anything but a nice relationship.

Chancellor Schultz waited until the next day to say he talked sternly to them about Taiwan. But, , it's not mentioned in the, Taiwan is not even mentioned once in the security strategy that the Germans have released. So you could see, and, and there's a business lobby in Germany that's quite strong given the nature of the structure of the German economy that's rooted in cars and chemicals which are the main industries invested in [01:11:00] China.

So they see their future really tied into that, and they're lobbying hard. That one should not, , , rattle that. The German economy overall is not that dependent on China. I think that's the fundamental point. The Germans are debating and realizing. And, but , the narrative is interesting there.

You see it all the time in European press, and unfortunately men, much of the US press picks this up without doing any research that China is Europe's, , top trading partner. Mm-hmm.[01:11:30] It's just factually incorrect. Incorrect because usually what, if you look at those news articles or politician speeches, the extent they even understood what they were saying, they're talking about trading goods.

Mm-hmm. So trading goods is where China's, , real expertise is, and where the U EU China trade is lodged. But that ignores trade and services, which is another big part of trade. That's where most jobs are in Europe and in the [01:12:00] United States. In services, not, not Goods and services are growing much more faster as a part of trade than goods.

And the digital revolution makes services easily exportable in ways that it wasn't before. If you put goods and services together, the United States is far more by f not even close. Europe's most important commercial partner, China is way back there because US EU services links are six times, six times [01:12:30] EU China services links.

It's not even close. And that doesn't include investment flows, which really drive. Mm-hmm. Our economies and, , US European investment flows just dwarf anything that either the US or, or Europe or investing in China. It's not even close. And there's no real Chinese investment anymore in Europe or the United States.

Mm-hmm. So we have a skewed media picture, which skews the narrative. From this legacy of the, of the, , post Cold War period that [01:13:00] we've left now. And so they're struggling to get out of that. I think they're making some headway, but it's not going to be easy, and one has to engage in that debate and show some of the facts that are, , where, where your real interests are, which frankly, still even in the commercial realm, are much more with the United States than they are with China.

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, I think that's such a good point about looking beyond just trading goods. I know in my own research it's kind of frustrating because of the, still in academic [01:13:30] research too, the very narrow focus on goods and, and not so much services and especially not investment flows. So war conflict to break out over Taiwan, between the US and China.

Can the US count on your support, do you think? 

Daniel Hamilton: I think there, there was a conflict over Taiwan. Of course it's hard. This is conjecture now, of course. But yes, I think so. I'm not sure what it means in practical terms. Mm-hmm.[01:14:00] Because the Europeans are far away. They don't have bases, they don't have, , big projection capabilities.

So in a military sense, they probably would not be contributing that much. But if they had better capability to defend themselves in Europe mm-hmm. Of course that would free up the US to do more in the Indo-Pacific without abandoning its nato commitments. So that would be, , some argue that's where Europe should contribute more.

Not [01:14:30] trying to become again, , a ma massive Indo-Pacific military powers, which is sort of frankly beyond them. So I don't, so the other, it would be in terms of either sanctions or in terms of political support. And I think you could count on the Europeans for, for much of that. So I think it's there, but , it's not a, it's not a acute issue in Europe.

I don't think they discuss it in that crisis sense, like we tend to do, at least at the moment. [01:15:00] 

Anita Kellogg: But you also wrote, I think it's interesting that NATO cannot ignore the security challenges from China. So what role, if any, should NATO play in Indo-Pacific security? 

Daniel Hamilton: Well, I think the point I'm trying to make, and I think it's been reflected now in both the US and the UK national security strategies, as well as the NATO strategic concept is that the security of the North Atlantic [01:15:30] and the in Pacific are becoming much more intertwined and interlinked.

And that's being driven particularly by the nature of China. And one has to start to think of these things as not either, or types of theaters mm-hmm. Security. But as how do we deal with those linkages? So one is China's technological prowess and how much of it is intertwined between the civilian and military sectors.

So developing all sorts of [01:16:00] technological capabilities that have challenges, not just for the United States and its Pacific Allies, but also for Europeans. Depending on where the technology goes related is, , China has become a power in Europe. It's not a half a world away. It's there, it's present.

I mentioned the 16 plus one, but it, , it has invested in some critical technology sectors in Europe buying companies. It has, , built the infrastructure through Huawei and others that [01:16:30] Europeans are still relying on in many ways. It's just present. It is built all sorts of debt issues throughout the Western Balkans, for instance, for countries.

It has bought ports all along Europe that are strategic for the alliance. So that's another area where Europe should be, have some concern. I think the third is the Russia, China on taunt. , China says it's neutral, but it's essentially pro Moscow neutral when it comes to [01:17:00] Ukraine and Russia is supporting China now in a whole set of issues.

So the Russia, China on taunt has changed the risk calculus for both Moscow and Beijing because both feel they can afford more risks than maybe they could have if they were, , at odds with each other or not aligned. I think that. Should cause some concern both in the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific, what that implies for us.[01:17:30] 

And finally, , China's territorial claims really, and its other claims on sort of the rules-based order affect the global commons. So freedom of navigation, freedom of, , in, of the internet, of, , information of outer space. Much of the basic norms governing that the global commons are being challenged by China.

So Europe, if you think 80% of Europe's seaborne trade flows through Straits and Indo-Pacific [01:18:00] that are challenged by China Europe has a vested interest in that. So I think we need to think about it in these ways. I don't think the answer is to, , send European warships off to the Indo-Pacific, cuz they only have a few of 'em.

And. That simply straps them even more when you have the biggest land war in Europe going on since World War ii. So I don't think that's the right approach, but I think starting to build connections with like-minded allies is an interesting one.[01:18:30] The, the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and so on, have been at NATO summits.

They're probably coming again. Japan has invited NATO to open a liaison office in Tokyo. And so it's not about NATO going global, it's about connecting with countries that share common security concerns and exchanging, , their views on that and, and cha sharing habits of operational, , cooperation, I guess is the best way to put it.[01:19:00] 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, I think that's really interesting because I know my perception of NATO is so European focused, but thinking about, of course, I also. Look at security is very intertwined, right? And China's very active. If we only approach it from an East Asian perspective, then we're very limited to what China's really doing to gain global influence.

But especially like sort of being such a military alliance. I think looking at those [01:19:30] roles, those linkages through NATO to kind of think about Indo-Pacific Security is really interesting. 

Daniel Hamilton: Yeah, we, , we think of NATO as a military alliance, but it's a political alliance that has military, , elements to it primarily.

But, , article three of the North Atlantic Treaty is about every country has to show it can defend itself and that's been interpreted mainly as you show your critical infrastructures and things are, , resilient. So if you, kinds of talk issues I'm talking about with China are about [01:20:00] disruption.

So if, if a threat you're facing is, is your society is going to be disrupted by a challenge, then your answer is to build, make yourself more resilient. And that starts to link you then to all sorts of other countries around the world to, to, to whom you're connected. So you have to think about protecting the connectedness that you have.

That's why the Global Commons and these issues are so important. It's not just about, , conventional military kinds of issues. And the North [01:20:30] Atlantic Treaty covers that. There's also Article two of the North Atlantic Treaty, which isn't used as much, but I think we'll probably we've looked at a bit more closely, which is that countries should help each other in their economic security.

So economic security is becoming clearly now a bigger issue. It's not NATO's, , lead issue, but NATO does provide capabilities that can help secure. Again, the flows and the kinds of things that [01:21:00] are needed to to protect our economies. So I'm not saying NATO is the answer to this. I'm just saying NATO is part of the puzzle.

And there are many other, the u s eu relationship probably more, , more important in those kinds of things than the nato piece of it. But NATO shouldn't be discounted. It's part of it. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, no, that's, that's interesting in aspects of NATO that I really may maybe didn't, we never talk about the, like economic security and other parts [01:21:30] of NATO beyond pure defense.

So what do you think the future of this transatlantic relationship should look like? Well, that's not a big question or anything. 

Daniel Hamilton: Well, I, I provided I think some answers, I think we need to move toward a more balanced relationship in which the Europeans are able to take on. , half of the job of deterring Russia and being the first responder in crises.

I think we need to [01:22:00] understand that. And I think the crisis and the aggression in Ukraine has shown us that we are not only each other's key strategic allies, we are each other's geo-economic base. And that base is quite resilient. , if you think of energy, Europe made a stunningly swift reversal to wean itself off of Russian energy.

Mm-hmm. And that meant the United States stepped in and has created now a new energy relationship with Europe that really didn't even exist just [01:22:30] a few years ago. So the transatlantic energy relationship becomes, , essential for Europe, important to the United States, and has allowed Europe to again resist, , blackmail and, and and much of the stuff that the Russians were doing.

Our commercial relationship remains the fulcrum of the global economy. Despite all the talk of everything else, the numbers don't lie. And as I said, 16 trillion economy across the Atlantic [01:23:00] it's, it's just, I mean, a 6 trillion economy, 16 million workers, I'm sorry, I'm getting the numbers mixed. Mm-hmm.

Dependent on this relationship , and it's, again, e each of our relations with China are important. But my analogy is on economics. It's like a two lane country highway. It's a goods highway mainly. And goods highway is important. It's, and it's, they're packed, , they're full of goods.

And if you have an accident on the goods highway, you're going to have a [01:23:30] problem, two-lane highway. But the transatlantic commercial relationship is a 12 lane Autobahn. It's, it's the goods, it's services, it's investment. We have, we are each other's greatest investors in each other's digital economy, the innovation economy, the jobs.

I mean, go on and on. And so companies work that way. They, they tend to use the transatlantic base to invest globally and be competitive globally. And CEOs I [01:24:00] talked to, they, they used to say, I don't know if they say it anymore. They say, yeah, futures in China, but I'm making money, money in Europe. Mm. The profits are not in China.

That's a kind of a, , a, a investment for the future. The profits are all in Europe. American companies never made more money in history and history than they did last year in Europe. Europe is by far where we invest, , in terms of US companies, and by far, Europe is the largest investor in the United States in terms of foreign investment.

[01:24:30] So we have to, , be grounded in, in who's still important to us. And if you do that, then I think you can start to build on that, to start to influence the shape of the world that we see and, and what I think is a world in age now of disruption, it's not just great power competition. Mm-hmm. I know non-state actors can have as just as much influence as many states these days.

Technology is disrupting us. Our innovation [01:25:00] potential is being challenged, but it's also this, the key to our ability to cope with this world and fast forward. And we are intertwined in ways in all of that then more than anybody else. And just to leave, , on that point, just one example is clean technology, right?

So we need to address the climate challenge. We need to reduce our dependencies on. China and Russia, and we need to also [01:25:30] loosen our dependencies on the kind of oral materials that have powered many of the supply chains and things that we have. We're only going to do that if we do that together. We're not going to meet the climate goals if each of us try to do this alone.

Mm-hmm. And we have the innovative potential to do this faster and to scale up commercial innovation faster than if we did it alone. We just did, I just was involved in a study in clean technology over the last seven years. Us, , investors have invested [01:26:00] over 23 billion in European clean tech.

And when they are part of a European deal that deal gets to market faster. The startup, , gets to market faster. The deal is bigger and growth is faster than if there wasn't a US partner, if it was just a European deal by itself. And. Over the last seven years, European investors invested over 20 billion in the US clean tech startup economy.

And the [01:26:30] same holds if they're involved US startups get to market faster, faster growth bigger deals, then if the Europeans were not involved. So we should build on that and start, , what I would call it, build a transatlantic Cleantech alliance, A tta. Mm-hmm. That makes good on the promise that President Biden and President Feline made that they said they were going to build a green technology alliance.

I would say, yeah, let's actually do that. Mm-hmm. And [01:27:00] so I'm hopeful that, , this will move forward. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. That's really interesting. And I'm wondering, these commercial ties are so important and do you think that they can maybe overcome sometimes Nationals politics in the us So you have, of course, other politicians who probably agree with Trump want to deemphasize the relationship with Europe.

You also have, like you said, on green energy, you have industrial [01:27:30] policy that actually discriminated against Europe, although I think they've come to some deal to mitigate that to some extent. So there, there are also, , future possibilities of, of increased tensions, I guess. And do you think maybe these commercial ties make those less problematic or is that, is that a real problem to think about?

Daniel Hamilton: Well, we're always going to have frictions across Atlantic on our [01:28:00] commercial relationship, but I think the question one might consider is why do we have these frictions and are they different than the kinds of frictions we have with other countries? Mm-hmm. And Bylar, and by and large, I would argue the frictions we have across Atlantic are because of our closeness, not because we're drifting apart.

It's because it's not because our economies are drifting away from each other, it's because they're colliding. We are so deeply intertwined with each other's societies and [01:28:30] economies in ways that others are not that different rules then, or , the different cultural preferences, different things like that really affect how companies can work or barriers.

And that raises all sorts of issues. These are not traditional trade barriers. We essentially have free trade across Atlantic, non-trade barriers, ? Mm-hmm. It's regulations. Mm-hmm. It's your preferences of whether you want G m O foods or not. I mean, it's things like that. It's not really the traditional [01:29:00] type of conflict, but because they're so deeply domestic, it makes it very hard to resolve.

So we're always going to have those issues. The challenge that seems to me is how do you manage them and not lose sight of the, of the, , bigger goals, which is yes, let's manage some difficulties that have come up now with the the US legislation on green technology and sub subsidies, European subsidized things also.

They just do it differently and that's what creates the difference in the problem. [01:29:30] Let's manage those issues. But let's still leap ahead and think about the tact, the Clean Tech Alliance and how we harness our opportunity while we manage those problems. Don't let those problems be the thing that stop us.

Mm-hmm. And we've had that problem in the past where either officials on either side say, , well, let's, let's have a test case. If we can't solve this case , like how you clean a chicken which is different on each side of the Atlantic, then we're not going to do anything else. So, yes, we have voices who say that, [01:30:00] but I think that's very short.

Cited. It's not really in our, our mutual self-interest and we sh should manage chickens. Yes. Important industry, but that shouldn't determine the relationship. We should think about how to put that in the, , a chicken box in, figure it out while we move ahead with, , big, big issues that we have to deal with together.

Anita Kellogg: Yeah. I'm sorry. Do you think that there are any future threats to the relationship [01:30:30] in future administrations? Does that possibility 

Daniel Hamilton: exist? Well, you can always think about it. I, I don't think about it in sort of a, , threat thing. I think the way I would phrase it, , in a simple try to way, is for 70 years born of experience of two world wars and depression.

In, in the Cold War, the United States was a, a European power. We [01:31:00] were we were comprehensively and deeply integrated into all of the compromises and trade-offs and bargains the Europeans themselves were making. And we were a source of reassurance to them, largely that they could build a new type of Europe after they'd been killing each other for so long.

They could not have to look over their shoulder at each other. They could start to work on a common project because we were there with them. Mm-hmm. The end of the Cold War, we started [01:31:30] to have a debate in the United States again, whether we really were European power or whether we should just become another power in Europe.

And I think that debate about becoming a power in Europe is still with us. And it didn't start with Donald Trump. , I was in the Clinton administration. There were talk even at that point in the United States that, , , let the Europeans take care of themselves. This type of thing.

We found in the Balkan Wars, unfortunately, that Europe wasn't able [01:32:00] to take care of its own civil wars. We've seen it again in Ukraine. So this is not a compliment to our European colleagues. It is a reflection of us interests that in my view, we need to remain European power and much more comprehensively engaged than some would argue.

Being a power in Europe is a different approach to Europe. It says, again, the positive is Europeans are grown up, they should take care of themselves. We should, , let them do it, but we have other things to do. I [01:32:30] understand that argument. It, it, the, the more negative view of that is, , let's play the Europeans off against each other cuz it's so easy to do.

We don't really have a stake in their integration. , a looser continent might be better for us. Let's, , let's be a, we can be a spoiler. We don't have to always be a stakeholder in their projects. I understand that argument too. In a short term sense. On any particular issue, we're attempted to sort of play them off.

But over the long term, a [01:33:00] more fractious Europe is a return to the Europe that has caused so much pain to the United States. And I don't believe that's in US interest. So I think this debate, it's not about specific threat, but it about how Americans think of themselves in relationship to Europe. Do we have the capability, the priority to remain fundamentally engaged in European affairs or do we wanna step back and become just another power in Europe?

[01:33:30] China right now is a power in Europe. Mm. And we see how China acts in Europe. It plays them off it, , does this or that. It creates issues for the Europeans that might not be in the best US interests for us to join China in doing that. And Russia certainly is doing it, I think would lead to Europe that I would hope none of us would really wanna see again.

Mm-hmm. 

Anita Kellogg: Yeah, definitely. Well, this has been so insightful. Thank you so much for coming on [01:34:00] the show. Thank you. We're 

Daniel Hamilton: happy to join you. 

Anita Kellogg: I hope you enjoyed listening to the interview. That brings us to the end of this episode of Kellogg's Global Politics. You can visit our website at www kelloggs global politics.com and follow us on Twitter at Global Kellogg, or me ar Kellogg.

Ryan Kellogg: You can also reach us by email. So anita@kelloggglobalpolitics.com and myself, Ryan at kellogg's global politics.com. And as always, please see [01:34:30] the show notes for the articles we discussed in this episode. And if you like the show, please take the time to tell your friends and share it on your social sites.

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